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I.  INTRODUCTION: 2020—AN UGLY YEAR FOR OIL & GAS 
To put it simply, 2020 was an exceptionally trying year for the 
United States' oil and gas industry and, as a result, for energy lenders.  As 
2020 began, West Texas Intermediate (“WTI”) crude oil futures traded at 
approximately $61 per barrel.1  On January 21, 2020, the United States 
Energy Information Association projected moderately declining prices 
through the first half of 2020, predicated in part on unrest in the Middle 
East and other geopolitical factors.2  Unfortunately, WTI prices declined 
at a considerably steeper rate than expected.  By February 1, 2020, WTI 
traded at approximately $50 per barrel.3  Things would only get worse. 
By then, the COVID-19 pandemic was wreaking havoc on the 
economies of China and several other nations, causing a dramatic decline 
in international demand for crude oil.4  In its February Oil Market Report, 
the International Energy Association predicted a massive contraction in 
global demand for oil resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic.5    At or 
around that same time, members of the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (“OPEC”) and other non-member oil exporting 
 
1. Crude Oil Prices: West Texas Intermediate (WTI) – Cushing, Oklahoma 1Y, U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,  https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=NPX [https://perma.cc/ZBX8-
X9Q2] [hereinafter Crude Oil Prices] (last visited Dec. 16, 2020).  
2. Matt French, EIA Forecasts Crude Oil Prices Will Fall in the First Half of 2020, Then 
Rise Through 2021, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Jan. 21, 2020), 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=42535 [https://perma.cc/W3EB-TCCN]. 
3. Crude Oil Prices, supra note 1. 
4. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, OIL MARKET REPORT - FEBRUARY 2020 1 (2020), 
https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-february-2020 [https://perma.cc/GAM2-
QGAP].  
5. Id. (projecting “the first quarterly contraction in more than 10 years.”). 
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nations, led in large part by Russia,6 engaged in discussions of additional 
production cuts to manage long-term pricing.7  On Friday, March 6, 2020, 
those discussions collapsed when Russia refused to join in OPEC's 
proposed production cuts, sparking a dangerous production and pricing 
war between Saudi Arabia and Russia.8  Saudi Arabia returned fire by 
offering dramatic discounts on the price of its oil and announcing plans 
to ramp up its production.  The effects of that price war manifested 
immediately.  On Monday, March 9, 2020, oil prices saw their greatest 
single-day decline since 1991.9   
As COVID-19 spread, many nations, including the United States, 
implemented shutdowns or other “containment measures”10 in an effort 
to mitigate the spread of the pandemic.11  The combined effects of 
reduced global demand, the Saudi-Russia price war, and excess supply 
were devastating.  On March 5, 2020, WTI traded at $45.90.12  By March 
 
6. OPEC's member-nations and 10 non-member nations led by Russia are collectively 
known as “OPEC+”.  See David Hodari et al., Oil Prices Plunge After Russia-Saudi Split, 
WALL STREET J. (Mar. 6, 2020, 4:10 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-russian-
deadlock-pushes-brent-crude-to-2-year-low-11583500044?page=53 
[https://perma.cc/WR2P-RH3M].  
7. Stanley Reed, Oil Prices Nose-Dive as OPEC and Russia Fail to Reach a Deal, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/06/business/opec-oil-prices-
russia.html [https://perma.cc/8ZAM-Y8AN]; see also Will Kennedy, Why the OPEC-Russia 
Blowup Sparked All-Out Oil Price War, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 9, 2020, 12:28 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-09/why-opec-russia-blowup-sparked-
all-out-oil-price-war-quicktake [https://perma.cc/W22X-L3AX]. 
8. Ariel Cohen, OPEC+ Talks Collapse Sending Crude Prices to 2017 Lows, FORBES (Mar. 
6, 2020, 5:04 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2020/03/06/opec-talks-collapse-
sending-crude-prices-to-2017-lows/?sh=a644d38431d6 [https://perma.cc/AZW8-VGJK].  
9. Natasha Turak, Oil Nose-Dives as Saudi Arabia and Russia Set Off ‘Scorched Earth’ 
Price War, CNBC (Mar. 8, 2020, 9:01 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/08/opec-deal-
collapse-sparks-price-war-20-oil-in-2020-is-coming.html [https://perma.cc/8FVF-FEPS].  
10. In the U.S., these measures included, among other things, government-mandated 
shutdowns of non-essential businesses (e.g., bars and restaurants), restrictions on international 
travel, and banning large public gatherings (e.g., concerts, sporting events, etc.).  Many state 
and local governments issued “stay-at-home” or “shelter-in-place” orders in attempt to limit 
public interaction, and many businesses required employees to work from home.  See, e.g., 
AJMC Staff, A Timeline of COVID-19 Developments in 2020, AM. J. MANAGED CARE (Jan. 
1, 2021), https://www.ajmc.com/view/a-timeline-of-covid19-developments-in-2020 
[https://perma.cc/B4DM-D7PZ]; Elvia Limon, Here's How the COVID-19 Pandemic Has 
Unfolded in Texas Since March, TEXAS TRIB. (July 31, 2020), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2020/07/31/coronavirus-timeline-texas/ 
[https://perma.cc/94FB-ECGT].     
11. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 4. 
12. Crude Oil Prices, supra note 1. 
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30, 2020, WTI traded at $14.10.13  WTI prices continued to collapse in 
April, due to concerns over a scarcity of available storage and low 
demand for oil.14  Infamously, on April 20, 2020, WTI futures fell to the 
lowest price in United States history at -$36.98.15  While prices improved 
to nearly $50 by year-end 2020, price volatility and downward demand 
trends proved catastrophic, resulting in roughly $145 billion in write 
downs among United States and European exploration and production 
companies.16 
To make matters worse, natural gas fared little better than oil in 
2020.  As the U.S. Energy Information Administration (“EIA”) explained 
in a July 13, 2020 report: 
 
In the first half of 2020, natural gas prices at the U.S. 
Henry Hub benchmark reached record lows. The average 
monthly Henry Hub spot price in the first six months of 
the year was $1.81 per million British thermal units 
(MMBtu). Monthly prices reached a low of 
$1.63/MMBtu in June, the lowest monthly inflation-
adjusted (real) price since at least 1989. Prices started the 
year low because of mild winter weather, which resulted 
in less natural gas demand for space heating. Beginning 
in March, spring weather and the economic slowdown 
induced by mitigation efforts for the coronavirus disease 
2019 (COVID-19) contributed to lower demand, further 
lowering prices. 17 
 
13. Id. 
14. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, INTERIM STAFF REPORT, TRADING IN 
NYMEX WTI CRUDE OIL FUTURES CONTRACT LEADING UP TO, ON, AND AROUND APRIL 20, 
2020, at 2–3 (2020), 
https://www.cftc.gov/media/5296/InterimStaffReportNYMEX_WTICrudeOil/download 
[https://perma.cc/GN2P-PMUG]. 
15. Catherine Ngai et al., Oil Plunges Below Zero for First Time in Unprecedented 
Wipeout, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 19, 2020, 6:28 PM),  
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-19/oil-drops-to-18-year-low-on-global-
demand-crunch-storage-woes [https://perma.cc/N4VP-5AAY].  
16. Collin Eaton & Sarah McFarlane, 2020 Was One of the Worst-Ever Years for Oil Write-
Downs, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 27, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/2020-was-one-
of-the-worst-ever-years-for-oil-write-downs-11609077600 [https://perma.cc/X5T2-DTU8].  
17. Kristen Tsai & Stephen York, U.S. Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Prices Reached 
Record Lows in First Half of 2020, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.  (July 13, 2020), 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=44337 [https://perma.cc/F65F-XAVK].  
134 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 25 
Unsurprisingly, these compounding adverse market forces precipitated a 
flood of oil and gas related bankruptcy filings.  By October 22, 2020, at 
least 84 oil and gas producers and oil field services companies had filed 
for bankruptcy relief, seeking to administer a staggering $89 billion in 
cumulative debt.18   
Typically, when oil and gas prices plummet, oil and gas 
producers face dramatic adjustments to their borrowing bases under 
reserve-based loans.19  As prices fall, borrowers' collateral—chiefly their 
mineral reserves—dramatically decrease in value.20  Availability of credit 
under reserve-based loans is typically tied to the value of the reserves 
securing the loan, known as the borrowing base.21  When the value of 
reserves declines, the borrowing base similarly declines, restricting a 
borrower's available credit.22  Oil and gas producers therefore often file 
for relief to address liquidity concerns caused by borrowing base 
reductions.23 
Recently, oil and gas borrowers have also used bankruptcy as a 
means of restructuring or disposing of disadvantageous contracts.  Those 
efforts have led to a series of hotly contested and extensively litigated 
challenges involving midstream gathering agreements, and whether those 
gathering agreements granted midstream partners' real property interests 
in upstream debtors' minerals.24  The implications of the rulings of those 
 
18. Artem Abramaov & Lefteris Karaagiannopoulos, North American Oil and Gas 
Bankruptcy Debt Reached an All Time High in 2020 and Is Set to Grow, RYSTAD ENERGY 
(Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.rystadenergy.com/newsevents/news/press-releases/north-
american-oil-and-gas-bankruptcy-debt-reached-an-all-time-high-in-2020-and-is-set-to-grow/ 
[https://perma.cc/37F8-F4DB].  
19. Paul J O'Donnell & Carin Dehne-Kiley, Spring Reserve-Based Lending 
Redeterminations Result in a Liquidity Squeeze for Speculative-Grade E&P Companies, S&P 




20. Id. A simple hypothetical proves this concept.  If a borrower has 1,000 barrels of oil 
reserves in the ground and can realize $100 per barrel, the borrower's reserves are worth 
$100,000.  If prices fall to $50 per barrel, the borrower's reserves are worth only $50,000. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. See id. (at least two of the entities identified in Table 1, Extraction Oil & Gas Inc. and 
Chesapeake Energy Corp., filed for bankruptcy relief and are subjects of this article). 
24. In the context of oil and gas operations, “upstream” refers to the production of 
hydrocarbons from the ground—these companies are often referred to as “exploration and 
production” or “E&P” companies; “midstream” refers to the transportation, storage and 
processing of hydrocarbons from the site of production to refineries and processing facilities; 
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cases are expansive.  As illustrated in recent decisions, a debtor’s ability 
to reorganize may hinge on whether it can reject uneconomic gathering 
agreements.  Further, a court’s determination of whether a midstream 
gathering agreement creates a real property interest can materially affect 
whether an upstream debtor’s lender can recover fair value for its 
collateral.  In some instances, a gathering agreement may create a real 
property interest so burdensome that the encumbered mineral estate may 
have value only the midstream gatherer, regardless of whether a senior 
secured lender has a lien against those assets.   As one equally troubling 
case shows, even a debtor’s successful rejection of a burdensome 
midstream gathering agreement may leave lenders with few options for 
repayment. 
This article addresses, in detail, potential disputes between 
upstream debtors and their midstream counterparties, key cases 
discussing whether a debtor can reject economically disadvantageous 
contracts, how the risks associated with midstream contracts affect 
underwriting loans to upstream exploration and production companies, 
and recent developments in case law affecting debtors' and lenders' rights 
against midstream parties. 
Because this article involves complex issues related to oil and gas 
and bankruptcy law, Part II of this article of this article provides a brief 
primer on the oil and gas industry, interests in minerals under state laws, 
gathering agreements, and how executory contracts and other claims are 
treated under bankruptcy law.25  Part III of this article addresses one of 
the most influential recent cases concerning gathering agreements in 
bankruptcy—In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation26—and why it was 
 
and “downstream” refers to the refining and marketing of hydrocarbons for sale to consumers. 
Adam Muspratt, Introduction to Oil and Gas Industry, OIL & GAS IQ (May 1, 2019), 
https://www.oilandgasiq.com/strategy-management-and-information/articles/oil-gas-
industry-an-introduction [https://perma.cc/3ZEL-7V77].  
25. See infra Part II. 
26. In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 547 B.R. 66 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016); In re Sabine Oil 
& Gas Corp., 550 B.R. 59 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016). Sabine involved two rulings of the 
bankruptcy court.  In the first ruling, the court authorized Sabine to reject its midstream 
gathering agreements Nordheim Eagle Ford Gathering, LLC and HPIP Gonzales Holdings, 
LLC, but the court declined to make any final determination as to whether those gathering 
agreements formed covenants running with the land.  Sabine, 547 B.R. at 79–80.  Sabine then 
filed adversary proceedings against Nordheim and HPIP seeking a declaratory ruling that the 
covenants did not run with the land.  Sabine, 550 B.R. at 62.  On appeal, both opinions were 
affirmed by the district court, see In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 567 B.R. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 
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beneficial to both upstream debtors and their lenders.27  Part IV addresses 
midstream companies' attempts to avoid the Sabine ruling, and two 
important decisions—In re Alta Mesa Resources, Inc.28 and In re 
Badlands Energy, Inc.29—that contradicted and declined to follow 
Sabine.30   Part V addresses three decisions from 2020,31 two of which 
evidence a return to Sabine even despite the best efforts of midstream 
gatherers to create real property interests in their upstream counterparties' 
minerals.32  Part VI addresses the In re Southland Royalty Company33 
conundrum, explains why an upstream debtor's ability to reject a 
gathering agreement is not a cure-all that enables a successful 
restructuring, and proposes a financing alternative that could cure some 
of the uncertainty associated with gathering agreements and their effects 
on senior encumbrances.34  Part VII summarizes and concludes this 
article.35 
II.  BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
A. Oil and Gas Basics: From Geology to Gasoline—Upstream, 
Midstream, and Downstream Sectors  
The oil and gas industry represents a full chain of businesses that, 
together, locate, extract, refine, and sell petrochemical products to 
businesses and consumers.  Generally speaking, the oil and gas industry 
can be broken into three discrete sectors: upstream; midstream; and 
downstream.  The Library of Congress provides a succinct description of 
each of these sectors: 
 
 
2017), and ultimately by the Second Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals, see In re Sabine Oil & 
Gas Corp., 734 F. App'x 64 (2d Cir. 2018). 
27. See infra Part III.  
28. 613 B.R. 90 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2019).   
29. 608 B.R. 854 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2019). 
30. See infra Part IV.   
31. In re Southland Royalty Co. LLC, 623 B.R. 64, 98 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020); In re 
Chesapeake Energy Corp., 622 B.R. 274 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2020); In re Extraction Oil & Gas 
Inc., 622 B.R. 581 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020). 
32. See infra Part V 
33. 623 B.R. at 64.   
34. See infra Part VI. 
35. See infra Part VII.  
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The upstream segment of the oil and gas industry contains 
exploration activities, which include creating geological 
surveys and obtaining land rights, and production 
activities, which include onshore and offshore drilling.36 
 
The midstream sector covers transportation, storage, and 
trading of crude oil, natural gas, and refined products . . . 
.  [O]nce the oil has been extracted and separated from 
natural gas, pipelines transport the products to another 
carrier or directly to a refinery.37 
 
The downstream sector covers refining and marketing . . 
. .  [M]arketing is the wholesale and retail distribution of 
refined petroleum products to business, industry, 
government, and public consumers.38 
 
Each of the sectors is heavily reliant on each other.  An upstream 
exploration and production company may locate, drill, and extract oil and 
gas from a basin in Utah but if it does so, it needs both a purchaser and a 
means to get its petrochemicals to a refinery, which may be in Texas or 
some other faraway place.  As a result, it is likely to enter into what is 
commonly referred to as a “gathering agreement” with a midstream 
partner.39  Under that gathering agreement, the midstream partner gathers 
extracted petrochemicals at storage tanks or at gas wellheads and 
transports them to a downstream partner, collecting transportation fees 
from the producer or purchasing and reselling the production downstream 
at a profit (or both).40  The downstream partner may then refine the 
 
36. Upstream Production and Exploration, LIBR. OF CONGRESS, https://guides.loc.gov/oil-
and-gas-industry/upstream [https://perma.cc/CH8E-2X6P].  
37. Midstream: Transportation, LIBR. OF CONGRESS, https://guides.loc.gov/oil-and-gas-
industry/midstream [https://perma.cc/VD92-G868].  
38. Downstream: Refining and Marketing, LIBR. OF CONGRESS, https://guides.loc.gov/oil-
and-gas-industry/downstream [https://perma.cc/R6QR-8G5E].  
39. Energy Infrastructure Primer: A Guide for Both New and Experienced Investors, 
ALERIAN (May 2019), https://www.alerian.com/wp-content/uploads/EI-Primer-May-
2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LEB-XGBW]; Daniel M. Kennedy, A Primer on Gathering and 
Processing Agreements and Their Impact on Asset Value,  NEWSL. (North Houston Ass’n of 
Prof’l Landmen, Hou., Tex.), Spring 2017, at 3, 
https://nhapl.org/resources/Documents/2017%20NHAPL%20Spring%20Newsletter.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NUQ9-LYMS].  
40. LIBR. OF CONGRESS, supra note 37.   
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petrochemicals into clean natural gas and gasoline and sell them through 
retail channels, including gas stations. 
1.  The Importance of Gathering Agreements 
Upstream exploration and production companies may extract 
minerals from the ground in a relatively isolated place, far from 
developed infrastructure.41  After petrochemicals are produced, they are 
generally separated into oil, gas, and water, and must be further refined 
before they are sold to their end users.42  But how do they get to a refinery 
and to market?  Produced crude oil is typically stored in large tanks near 
the wellhead and can be moved by truck, rail, or pipeline thereafter.43  
Natural gas, on the other hand, is typically collected at the wellhead and 
moved almost exclusively by pipeline either to a compression station or 
other area where gas is aggregated and then moved through larger 
pipelines to downstream partners.44 
Developing pipelines for the transmission of petrochemicals is 
costly and requires considerable planning and permitting to ensure the 
efficient gathering, processing, pressurization, and pumping of 
petrochemicals through the larger interstate pipeline system.45  As a 
result, midstream companies typically require upstream companies to 
enter into long-term gathering agreements before they will begin to 
develop pipeline infrastructure to the upstream companies' well heads.46 
Gathering agreements establish the terms and conditions under 
which the midstream company will purchase, process, and transport the 
upstream company's petrochemicals.  Most gathering agreements contain 
a “dedication” in which the upstream company promises that all of its 
minerals from certain geographic areas will be sold to the midstream 
 
41. Jad Mouawad, Oil Explorers Searching Ever More Remote Areas, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
9, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/09/business/worldbusiness/oil-explorers-
searching-ever-more-remote-areas.html [https://perma.cc/27T5-ZCYY].  
42. Energy Infrastructure Primer: A Guide for Both New and Experienced Investors, supra 
note 39.  
43. Id.  
44. Kennedy, supra note 39.  
45. Id.  
46. Energy Infrastructure Primer: A Guide for Both New and Experienced Investors, supra 
note 39. 
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company and transported by the midstream company during the term of 
the gathering agreement, which may be as long as twenty to thirty years.47   
A dedication in a gathering agreement essentially grants the 
midstream company a monopoly to process, trade, and transport all of the 
upstream company's petrochemicals from a specific area for a slated 
period of time.  This does two things: (1) it ensures the upstream company 
will always have a buyer for extracted petrochemicals; and (2) ensures 
the midstream company will have a revenue stream from all of the 
petrochemicals extracted by the upstream company.  The midstream 
company can generally determine the volume of petrochemicals that the 
upstream company is likely to extract during the term by analyzing the 
upstream company's reserve reports and other pertinent data, and so have 
a reasonable idea of the likely profits it might earn during the term of the 
gathering agreement.  Those profits are used to offset the cost of 
constructing the pipeline infrastructure and linking the upstream 
company's wells to the midstream company's pipeline system.  The 
monopolistic dedication is central to the business arrangement between 
upstream and midstream entities and is used to mitigate risks of 
nonpayment and to preclude competition from other midstream 
companies.48   
2.  Interests in Minerals 
Below is an actual example of a dedication from a gathering 
agreement between an upstream exploration and production company 
and its midstream partner:  
 
Shipper dedicates to the performance of this Agreement 
the Dedicated Properties and Dedicated Gas and grants to 
Williams the exclusive right to Gather, Process, 
Dehydrate and Treat the Produced Dedicated Gas 
(“Dedication”).  This Dedication shall be a covenant 
running with the land under applicable law and binding 
on the respective successors and assigns of the interests 
of Shipper and its Affiliates in and to the Dedicated 
Properties and Dedicated Gas.  If applicable law requires 
 
47. Id; Kennedy, supra note 39.   
48. Kennedy, supra note 39. 
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any amendment or modification to this Agreement for 
this Dedication to be treated as an enforceable covenant 
running with the land, the parties will promptly enter into 
any such addendum or modification.  Gatherer may file 
memoranda of this Agreement substantially in the form 
of Exhibit “J” in local land records from time to time in 
its discretion, and Shipper will promptly enter into any 
such memoranda upon request.49 
 
The dedication includes a pledge of all of the upstream company's 
minerals associated with certain leases or geographic areas.  The 
monopolistic pledge combined with the thirty-year term found in this 
gathering agreement mitigates the midstream company's risk of loss 
associated with developing its pipeline infrastructure to the upstream 
company's wells.   
Even so, the midstream company is not without risk.  While the 
dedication purports to convey an interest in minerals to the midstream 
company, parties to this and similar gathering agreements have hotly 
litigated just what type of interest in minerals was actually conveyed to 
the midstream gatherer.50  As detailed in cases like Alta Mesa and 
Extraction, addressed below, the nature of the interest conveyed in a 
gathering agreement can materially affect the contract parties' rights in 
bankruptcy.   
There are two types of interests that can be conveyed by 
dedications in gathering agreements: (1) real property interests or (2) 
personal property interests.  Rules differ by state for classifying oil and 
gas interests as either real or personal property.  Therefore, whether an 
oil and gas leasehold interest constitutes a real or personal property 
interest hinges on the case law of the particular state where the oil and 
gas property is located.  Under Texas law, for instance, an oil and gas 
 
49. First Amended Complaint for Avoidance and Related Declaratory Relief, Exhibit B, 
Gas Gathering, Processing, Dehydrating and Treating Agreement between Wamsutter LLC 
and Southland Royalty Company LLC (the “Wamsutter L63 Agreement”) at § 1.1(a), In re 
Southland Royalty Company, LLC Adv. Proc. No. 20-50551 (KBO) (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 13, 
2020), Adv. D.I. 28.   
50. See, e.g., In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 550 B.R. 59, 62 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016); In re 
Alta Mesa Res., Inc., 613 B.R. 90 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2019);In re Badlands Energy, Inc., 608 
B.R. 854 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2019);  In re Southland Royalty Co. LLC, 623 B.R. 64, 79 (Bankr. 
D. Del. 2020);  In re Chesapeake Energy Corp., 622 B.R. 274 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2020); In re 
Extraction Oil & Gas Inc., 622 B.R. 581 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020).  
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lease creates a determinable fee interest that vests the lessee with title to 
the hydrocarbons thereunder.  As explained by the Texas Supreme Court:  
 
The term “lease,” when used in an oil and gas context, is 
a misnomer.  The estate created by the oil and gas lease 
is not the same as those interests created under a “lease” 
governed by the law of landlord and tenant. 
The common oil and gas lease creates a determinable fee.  
It vests the lessee with title to oil and gas in place.  It 
logically follows, and has long been held by this court, 
that an oil and gas lease is a sale of an interest in land.51    
Under Texas law, conveyances of minerals in the ground through a 
mineral lease generally constitute conveyances of real property interests, 
which typically cannot be rejected by a debtor in bankruptcy.52  Kansas 
law, however, is entirely different and “an oil and gas lease does not 
create any present vested estate in the nature of title to the land which it 
covers or to the oil and gas in place.”53  In other words, oil and gas leases 
do not convey any interest in real property under Kansas law.  Rather, the 
lease “merely conveys a license to enter upon the land and explore for 
such minerals and if they are discovered to produce and sever 
them.”54  Consequently, Kansas oil and gas leases are considered 
executory contracts that may be rejected under section 365 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.55  
 
51. Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause, 641 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tex. 1982) (citations 
omitted); see also Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson, 94 S.W.3d 550, 554 (Tex. 2002) 
(“A Texas mineral lease grants a fee simple determinable to the lessee.”).  
52. In re Topco, Inc., 894 F.2d 727, 739 n. 17 (5th Cir. 1990) (“While we interpret the 
Bankruptcy Code as a matter of federal law, state law determines whether these contracts 
constitute unexpired leases subject to Section 365.  In Texas, they do not.  Instead, they convey 
interests in real property.  The term “oil and gas lease” is a misnomer because the interest 
created by an oil and gas lease is not the same as an interest created by a lease governed by 
landlord and tenant law.  As the district court noted, the so-called leaseholds at issue in this 
case actually constitute determinable fee interests.” (citations omitted)). 
53. In re J. H. Land & Cattle Co., 8 B.R. 237, 239 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981) (quoting 
Ingram v. Ingram, 214 Kan. 415, 521 P.2d 254, 257 (1974)). 
54. Id.  
55. Id.  The “Bankruptcy Code” refers to title 11 of the United States Code.  11 U.S.C. §§ 
101, et seq. 
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Oil and gas interests are also affected by the distinction drawn 
between hydrocarbons in the ground and those that have been extracted 
or produced.  As for the cases concerned herein, Texas, Utah, Oklahoma, 
Colorado, and Wyoming all consider oil and gas hydrocarbons to be real 
property while remaining in the ground, but personal property once 
extracted from the ground.56  This distinction proved to be instrumental 
in bankruptcy disputes over midstream gathering agreements.   
The central question to this article is whether language that 
purports to grant a midstream gatherer an interest in the upstream debtor's 
in-ground minerals actually results in the conveyance of a real property 
interest in those minerals.  Generally speaking, it is much easier to convey 
a personal property interest in minerals through a midstream dedication 
than a real property interest, because midstream companies typically deal 
only with personal property—i.e., extracted hydrocarbons.57  An 
upstream debtor's pledge to run all of its extracted minerals through the 
midstream counterparty's pipeline creates contractual interests in the 
upstream party's personal property—the extracted minerals—and creates 
 
56. Texas: In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 547 B.R. 66, 77 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016). (“Under 
Texas law, once minerals are extracted from the ground, such minerals cease to be real 
property and instead become personal property.”) (citing Sabine Prod. Co. v. Frost Nat. Bank 
of San Antonio, 596 S.W.2d 271, 276 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. 
Hunt Energy Corp., 47 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tex. App. 2000), pet. denied; Riley v. Riley, 972 S.W.2d 
149, 155 (Tex. App. 1998); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Adams, 513 F.2d 355, 363 (5th 
Cir.1975); see also In re Estate of Ethridge, 594 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. App. 2019). 
Utah:  In re Badlands Energy, Inc., 608 B.R. 854, 869 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2019) (“Under 
Utah law, 'real property' includes non-extracted minerals.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-1(3) 
(“'Real property' or 'real estate' means any right, title, estate, or interest in land, including all 
nonextracted minerals located in, on, or under the land . . . .”).   
Oklahoma: In re Alta Mesa Res., Inc., 613 B.R. 90, 99 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2019). 
(“Oklahoma draws a distinction between hydrocarbons resting beneath the ground and those 
that have been extracted.  Oil and gas is considered real property while it remains in the 
ground.  After the oil and gas is severed from the ground, it becomes personal property.”) 
(citing Local Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Okla. City v. Eckroat, 186 Okla. 660, 100 P.2d 261, 
263 (1940)).    
Colorado: Bill Barrett Corp. v. Lembke, 2018 COA 134, ¶ 26, aff'd on other grounds, 2020 
CO 73, ¶ 26, 474 P.3d 46 (“'[W]hile in place, minerals are real property.'“) (quoting Smith v. 
El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 720 P.2d 608, 609 (Colo. App. 1985)).   
Wyoming: Denver Joint Stock Land Bank of Denver v. Dixon, 57 Wyo. 523, 122 P.2d 
842, 845 (1942) (“It is true, of course, that when oil and gas have been brought to the surface, 
they become personal property.”). 
57. See, e.g.,  Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment against Defendant, Grand Mesa Pipeline, LLC; And Defendant's Motion For 
Permissive Abstention, at 17, In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 567 B.R. 869, 876 (S.D.N.Y. 
2017);  In re Extraction Oil & Gas, Inc., Case No. 20-11548 (CSS) (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 14, 
2020), D.I. 834.   
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what is, in essence, a services contract for a set term.58  Dedicating 
minerals in a way that creates a real property interest is more complicated.  
For example, in Wyoming and many other states,59 a dedication of 
minerals can create a covenant that runs with the land only if four 
elements are met:  (1) the original covenant must be enforceable; (2) the 
parties to the original covenant must have intended that the covenant run 
with the land; (3) the covenant must “touch and concern” the land; and 
(4) there must be privity of estate between the parties to the dispute.60     
3.  Why it Matters 
The distinction between real and personal property interests in 
minerals can be critical for an upstream debtor in bankruptcy and for a 
midstream company as its creditor.  While section 365 of the Bankruptcy 
Code entitles bankrupt debtors to assume or reject executory contracts, it 
does not enable a debtor to reject or otherwise avoid obligations arising 
under a covenant that runs with the land.  Covenants that run with the 
land are not executory contracts and cannot be rejected.61   
If a gathering agreement's dedication does not grant the 
midstream company a real property interest in the upstream debtor's 
minerals, the upstream debtor may reject the contract and seek to 
negotiate more favorable terms with its midstream counterparty, or even 
a new midstream competitor.  If, however, the gathering agreement grants 
the midstream company a real property interest, the upstream debtor is 
bound to the gathering agreement even if its terms are so economically 
penal due to changes in market conditions that the agreement will 
preclude the debtor from successfully reorganizing or even selling its 
interests in bankruptcy.  
 
58. In re Southland Royalty Co. LLC, 623 B.R. 64, 79 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020). 
59. See, e.g., Noyes v. McDonnell, 1965 OK 16, 398 P.2d 838 (Okla. 1965) (applying same 
elements under Oklahoma law); Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 
618, 623 (Utah 1989) (applying same elements under Utah law); see also LuMac Dev. Corp. 
v. Buck Point Ltd. Partnership, 61 Ohio App. 3d 558, 562, 573 N.E.2d 681 (1988) (applying 
same elements under Ohio law). 
60. Jacobs Ranch Coal Co. v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., LLC, 2008 WY 101, ¶ 9, 191 P.3d 
125, 129 (Wyo. 2008) (citing elements for creation of covenant running with land). 
61. See, e.g., Alta Mesa, 613 B.R. 90, 95. 
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B. Restructuring and Gathering Agreements in Bankruptcy Cases 
1.  Bankruptcy Basics 
In the United States, bankruptcy proceedings are governed by 
what is commonly referred to as the Bankruptcy Code, codified under 
Title 11 of the United States Code.62  A debtor initiates a bankruptcy case 
by filing a petition for bankruptcy relief with the bankruptcy court.63  The 
date on which a debtor files a petition for bankruptcy relief is known as 
the “petition date”.64  Claims are treated differently under the Bankruptcy 
Code depending on whether they arose prior to or after the petition date.65 
This article focuses on bankruptcy cases in which upstream 
debtors attempt to restructure their debts or reorganize their business 
operations.  Corporate reorganizations typically take place under Chapter 
11 of the Bankruptcy Code.66  A corporate debtor who files a petition for 
relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code continues to operate its 
business after the petition date as a “debtor-in-possession.”67  In a Chapter 
11 bankruptcy case, a debtor may attempt to restructure debts and exit 
bankruptcy as a going concern through a plan of reorganization,68 or it 
may liquidate its assets through a bankruptcy sale commonly known as a 
“363 sale”.69 
2.  Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy 
To facilitate reorganizations, the Bankruptcy Code allows debtors 
to assume or reject economically disadvantageous executory contracts 
and unexpired leases.70  While the term “executory contract” is not 
 
62. 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2018). 
63. Id. § 301(a) (“A voluntary case under a chapter of this title is commenced by the filing 
with the bankruptcy court of a petition under such chapter by an entity that may be a debtor 
under such chapter.”). 
64. See generally id. § 101. 
65. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1116.  
66. Id. § 1121. 
67. Id. § 1107. 
68. See generally, id. § 1129. 
69. See generally, id. § 363. 
70. See generally, id. § 365; see also PRACTICAL LAW BNKR. & RESTRUCTURING & 
PRACTICAL LAW FIN., EXECUTORY CONTRACTS AND LEASES: OVERVIEW (2020), Thompson 
Reuters Practical Law 8-381-2672. 
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defined under the Bankruptcy Code, it has been oft described by 
bankruptcy courts as “a contract under which the obligation of both the 
bankrupt [debtor] and the other party to the contract are so far 
unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would 
constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other.”71   In 
its simplest form, an executory contract is a contract pursuant to which 
both parties have continuing duties and obligations. 
Certain categories of contracts may not be assumed or rejected 
under the Bankruptcy Code, either because they are not executory or 
because they create some type of non-extinguishable interest.  For 
example, at least one court has ruled that a contract that conveys an 
interest in real property, or that creates a covenant running with the land, 
cannot be rejected in bankruptcy72—a concept particularly relevant to this 
article.  Additionally, loans or other financing arrangements are generally 
not executory contracts subject to assumption or rejection because the 
lender has no substantial performance obligations remaining.73  
Financing agreements are not executory contracts if the only performance 
that remains is repayment.74  Security agreements are likewise not 
executory where the security interest thereunder has fully vested.75  
 
71. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL, CIVIL RESOURCES MANUAL ch. 59, ¶ II, 
https://www.justice.gov/jm/civil-resource-manual-59-executory-contracts-bankruptcy 
[https://perma.cc/D35V-LL98] (last visited Feb. 3, 2021) (citing Countryman, Executory 
Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 Minn. L. R. 439, 460 (1973)); In re Murexco Petroleum, 
Inc., 15 F.3d 60 (5th Cir. 1994); In re Texscan Corp., 976 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Floyd, 882 F.2d 233, 235 (7th Cir. 1989); Sharon Steel Corp. v. National Fuel Gas 
Distrib. Corp., 872 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1989); In re Speck, 798 F.2d 279, 279-80 (8th Cir. 
1986); Gloria Mfg. Corp. v. International Ladies Garment Workers' Union, 734 F.2d 1020, 
1021 (4th Cir. 1984); In re Chateaugay Corp., 130 B.R. 162, 164 (S.D.N.Y 1991).  
72.  In re Badlands Energy, Inc., 608 B.R. 854, 875 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2019) (“Because the 
Agreements are covenants that run with the land under Utah law, Section 365 is simply not 
available.”); Sabine, 567 B.R. 869, 874 (“[I]t is not possible for a debtor to reject a covenant 
that “runs with the land,” since such a covenant creates a property interest that is not 
extinguished through bankruptcy.”).   
73. In re Cox, 179 B.R. 495, 498 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1995) (“Under the SmartBuy Contract, 
the parties do not have substantial obligations outstanding because the only performance 
remaining is the repayment of GMAC under the Contract.”).   
74. Id. (“A note is not an executory contract if the only performance that remains is 
repayment.”); In re Texstone Venture, Ltd., 54 B.R. 54, 56 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985) (“The 
legislative history of § 365 indicates that a note is not an executory contract if the only 
performance that remains is repayment.”).  
75. Leasing Serv. Corp. v. First Tennessee Bank Nat. Ass'n, 826 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 
1987) (“[I]n the present case, the security interest granted to LSC to secure Metler's obligation 
under the leases was fully vested. The consideration for the grant of the security interest was 
the lessor agreeing to lease the cranes to Metler and LSC agreeing to take an assignment of 
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While there are exceptions to a debtor's ability to assume an 
executory contract like those mentioned above, a debtor may typically 
assume an executory contract by (1) curing any outstanding defaults and 
(2) providing the counterparty adequate assurance of future 
performance.76  In other words, the debtor must pay what it owes, and 
prove that it can pay obligations under the contract as they come due in 
the future.  Importantly, if a debtor is going to assume a contract, it must 
assume all of the terms of the contract.77  A debtor cannot assume only 
beneficial provisions of an executory contract or reject adverse 
provisions.  It must assume or reject the contract in its entirety.   
Alternatively, a debtor can reject the executory contract.  
Rejection is treated as a statutory breach of contract and gives rise to a 
claim for rejection damages.78  A creditor's rejection damages claim is 
treated as a pre-petition general unsecured claim and is paid near the very 
bottom of the bankruptcy claims payment hierarchy detailed below.79   
A debtor's ability to assume or reject executory contracts is, 
therefore, a powerful weapon.80  It can, in effect, convert costly future 
 
the leases. Thus, the security interest was non-executory and therefore not subject to the 
rejection power of the trustee.”). 
76. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b) (2018). 
77. N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 531–32 (1984) (“Should the debtor-in-
possession elect to assume the executory contract, however, it assumes the contract cum onere 
. . . .”); In re Texstone Venture, Ltd., 54 B.R. 54, 56 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985) (“It is elementary 
that if a contract is to be rejected, it must be rejected in whole and not in part. Thus, the Debtor 
cannot retain those aspects of the contract to his benefit while rejecting the burdensome 
aspects of the contract. 'It is axiomatic that an assumed contract under Section 365 is 
accompanied by all of its provisions and conditions . . . a debtor may not retreat to this 
provision, derived from the inherent equitable powers of the bankruptcy courts to avoid an 
obligation while it enjoys a benefit which arises in conjunction with that obligation.'“) 
(quoting In re Holland Enterprises, Inc., 25 B.R. 301, 303 (E.D.N.C., 1982)).  
78. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (“Except as provided in subsections (h)(2) and (i)(2) of this section, 
the rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor constitutes a breach of 
such contract or lease . . . .”); In re FBI Distribution Corp., 330 F.3d 36, 42 (1st Cir. 2003) 
(“If the contract is rejected, . . . the contract is deemed breached on the date 'immediately 
before the date of the filing of the petition . . . .'“).   
79. 11 U.S.C. § 502(g); Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 531 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(g), 507) 
(“Damages on the contract that result from the rejection of an executory contract … must be 
administered through bankruptcy and receive the priority provided general unsecured 
creditors.”); FBI Distribution Corp., 330 F.3d 36, 42 (citing to 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(1) 
regarding rejection damages) (“[T]he nondebtor party has a prepetition general unsecured 
claim for breach of contract damages, one not entitled to administrative priority.”). 
80. See, e.g., Richmond Leasing Co. v. Capital Bank, N.A., 762 F.2d 1303, 1310 (5th Cir. 
1985) (“[Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code] provides a means whereby a debtor can force 
others to continue to do business with it when the bankruptcy filing might otherwise make 
them reluctant to do so.”).  
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obligations into pre-petition general unsecured claims likely to be paid 
pennies on the dollar.81  As a result, debtors often threaten rejection in 
order to obtain contractual concessions, price improvements, and 
favorable lease amendments before agreeing to assume the contract.82   If 
those threats fail, debtors may simply reject uneconomical executory 
contracts and move on.         
3.  Claim Payment Hierarchy: The Waterfall of Funds83 
In most Chapter 11 reorganizations, there are insufficient funds 
to pay all creditors in full.  Whether a creditor is paid in full, pennies on 
the dollar, or not at all, generally depends on what type of claim the 
creditor has.  Claims are paid according to a statutory hierarchy under the 
Bankruptcy Code often referred to as the “absolute priority rule.”84 The 
absolute priority rule provides that all creditors holding a claim of a type 
higher up the claim hierarchy must be paid in full before any creditor 
holding a claim of a type lower on the hierarchy is paid anything.85  
Atop the claim hierarchy are claims secured by collateral that 
were properly perfected as of the petition date.86  The Bankruptcy Code 
provides that such claims must be paid up to the value of the collateral.87  
If, however, an alleged secured claim was not perfected on the petition 
date, a debtor or trustee may be able to avoid any alleged lien,88 thus 
 
81. For example, as further discussed herein, Southland Royalty Company's ability to 
reorganize in Chapter 11 hinged almost exclusively on rejected its burdensome midstream 
gathering agreements in order to generate any interest in its assets from potential buyers.   
82. See, e.g., Debtors’ Omnibus Reply to Objections to the Third Amended Joint Plan of 
Reorganization of Triangle USA Petroleum Corporation and its Subsidiary Debtors, at ¶ 14-
17, In re Triangle USA Petroleum Corporation, Case No. 16-11566 (MFW) (Bankr. D. Del. 
Mar. 8, 2017), D.I. 807 (discussing debtors' alleged “'high stakes strategy' of threatening 
rejection to bring about negotiations” to revise their midstream agreements).  
83. Author John Kane thanks his former partner Jason Binford for his assistance preparing 
this synopsis of the claim payment hierarchy in bankruptcy cases.   
84. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2). 
85. See Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Savs. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 
442 (1999); Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 115–16 (1939), superseded by 
statute as stated in In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 95 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing 
Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville N.A. & C. Ry. Co., 174 U.S. 552 (1889)).   
86. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2). 
87. See id. § 506(a)(1) (providing that a creditor’s claim is secured up to the value of the 
underlying collateral); id. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (discussing how secured claims must be treated in 
a plan of reorganization).  Generally speaking, secured creditors are not entitled to full 
payment for the amount of their claim in excess of the collateral’s value.  See id. § 506. 
88. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a).   
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sending the creditor plummeting down the hierarchy to join the ranks of 
the unsecured creditors. 
Administrative expense claims sit just below secured claims on 
the claim hierarchy.89  Administrative expense claims arise out of the 
administration of the debtor's business post-petition, and include 
professional fees, post-petition rent, and post-petition operational 
expenses.90  Payment of administrative expense claims is critical to a 
successful reorganization and must, by statute, be paid in full upon 
confirmation of a plan of reorganization.91  If a debtor cannot pay its 
administrative expense claims, it is deemed administratively insolvent, 
and cause exists to convert a reorganization into a Chapter 7 liquidation.92 
Immediately junior to administrative expense claims are priority 
claims.93  Priority claims are unsecured claims that Congress decided that 
debtors should pay before other types of unsecured claims.94  These 
include certain wage claims payable to the debtor's employees, certain 
taxes, and claims payable for public policy reasons, such as alimony and 
child support.95   
Unsecured claims that do not fall into any of priority categories 
are known as “general unsecured claims.”96  General unsecured claims 
may consist of things like unpaid pre-petition trade debt, unpaid pre-
petition rent, or rejection damages claims.97  General unsecured claims 
typically make up a large portion of the debts owed by a bankrupt debtor 
but, because they are junior to nearly all other classes of claims, they are 
typically paid only pennies on the dollar, if anything at all.98   
 
89. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b). 
90. See id. (administrative expenses include “the actual, necessary costs and expenses of 
preserving the estate” including certain post-petition costs and expenses, and professional fees 
awarded under 11 U.S.C. § 330, among others). 
91. See id. § 1129(a)(9). 
92. See id. § 1112(b)(4)(A).  Cause includes “substantial or continuing loss to or diminution 
of the estate and absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation.”  A debtor cannot 
“rehabilitate” or reorganize if it cannot pay all allowed administrative expense claims on the 
effective date of a plan of reorganization.  11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9). 
93. Id. § 507(a); see also id. § 503.  
94. See id. § 507. 
95. Id.  
96. See id. §§ 506–507 (referred to as “general” unsecured claims to differentiate them 
from “priority” unsecured claims because they receive no special treatment under the 
Bankruptcy Code.) 
97. See § 502(g). 
98. See id. § 1129(b); and see Baird, Bris & Zhu, The Dynamics of Large and Small 
Chapter 11 Cases: An Empirical Study, AM. BANKR. INST. (Nov. 2005) (discussing 
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Finally, at the very bottom of the claim hierarchy are the debtor's 
equity interest holders.99  Equity interest holders receive distributions 
from the estate only in the rare event that all other creditors are paid in 
full, plus post-petition interest.100 
4.  The Executory Contract Battleground 
As noted above, if a gathering agreement grants a midstream 
company a real property interest in the upstream debtor's minerals, the 
debtor cannot reject the gathering agreement.101  As a result, the debtor 
must continue post-petition performance under the gathering agreement.  
The upstream debtor's post-petition obligations under the gathering 
agreement are administrative expenses102 which must be paid in full for 
the debtor to effectuate a reorganization.103  Moreover, if the midstream 
party to the gathering agreement is a beneficiary of a covenant running 
with the land, its interests attach to minerals in the ground.  As a result, it 
must receive those minerals once extracted as required by the gathering 
agreement, thereby securing a future revenue stream.  Midstream parties 
to gathering agreements therefore have a vested interest in obtaining a 
real property interest in the upstream debtor's minerals and vigorously 
contesting whether their gathering agreement is subject to rejection. 
 
distribution percentages to unsecured creditors in chapter 11 reorganizations) 
http://commission.abi.org/sites/default/files/priority.pdf [https://perma.cc/PHB4-DMPM]. 
99. Id. § 726(a)(6). 
100. See id.; see also In re La. Indus. Coatings, Inc., 31 B.R. 688, 697 (Bankr. E.D. La. 
1983). 
101. See In re Badlands Energy, Inc., 608 B.R. 854, 875 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2019) (“Because 
the Agreements are covenants that run with the land under Utah law, Section 365 is simply 
not available.”); see also In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 567 B.R. 869, 874 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) 
(“[I]t is not possible for a debtor to reject a covenant that “runs with the land,” since such a 
covenant creates a property interest that is not extinguished through bankruptcy.”).  
102. In re Applied Theory Corp., 312 B.R. 225, 237 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Section 
503(b) allows administrative expense treatment for 'the actual, necessary costs and expenses 
of preserving the estate. . . for services rendered after the commencement of the case.' . . . 
[A]n expense is administrative only if it arises out of a transaction between the creditor and 
the bankrupt's trustee or debtor in possession, and 'only to the extent that the consideration 
supporting the claimant's right to payment was both supplied to and beneficial to the debtor-
in-possession in the operation of the business.'“) (citation omitted).   
103. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(A) (requiring claims under Bankruptcy Code sections 
507(a)(2)—i.e., administrative claims under section 503(b)—to be paid in full on the effective 
date of the plan in order for the plan to be confirmed); 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2).   
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By contrast, upstream debtors in bankruptcy benefit greatly if 
they have the flexibility to reject a gathering agreement as an executory 
contract.104  If the terms of the gathering agreement become financially 
punitive due to market volatility or pricing issues, as they did in 2020, 
debtors may wish to reject the contract and either seek a new midstream 
partner or negotiate an updated “market” gathering agreement that offers 
reduced volume requirements and economic terms that account for 
depressed prices.105  While rejection of a gathering agreement may give 
rise to a massive rejection damages claim in favor of the midstream party, 
that claim is treated as a general unsecured claim and may receive only a 
small fraction of its face value, if anything at all.106 
Unsurprisingly, as oil and gas prices precipitously declined in 
2020, some upstream debtors' gathering agreements grew increasingly 
financially onerous.  Multiple upstream debtors were left with little 
choice but to file for bankruptcy relief and sue to reject those gathering 
agreements as executory contracts.107  In three recent decisions,108 the 
debtors' ability to restructure hinged on whether gathering agreements 
 
104. See supra note 81 regarding Southland's need to reject its gathering agreements in 
order for its reserve to be marketable.   
105. See Debtors’ Omnibus Reply to Objections to the Third Amended Joint Plan of 
Reorganization of Triangle USA Petroleum Corporation and its Subsidiary Debtors, supra 
note 82, at ¶ 3 (“The Debtors are saddled with substantially higher lease operating expenses . 
. . because much of their oil and gas production is “dedicated” to Caliber at above-market 
rates pursuant to the Specified Caliber Contracts. The Debtors negotiated the Specified 
Caliber Contracts during a period of strong commodity prices and rapid production growth . 
. . . The Specified Caliber Contracts . . . do not reflect the precipitous decline in commodity 
prices . . ., [placing] the Debtors at a systematic competitive disadvantage. The rejection or 
renegotiation of the Specified Caliber Contracts therefore remains an important restructuring 
objective.”).   
106. See, e.g., Order Confirming Fifth Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization 
of Chesapeake Energy Corporation and its Debtor Affiliates at Exhibit A, Fifth Amended 
Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of Chesapeake Energy Corporation and its Debtor 
Affiliates, In re Chesapeake Energy Corp., 622 B.R. 274 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2020) 
Case No. 20-33233. D. I. 2915. Chesapeake's confirmed chapter 11 plan provided for a 
maximum five percent (5%) recover to holders of unsecured claims (in addition to equity 
interest in the reorganized entity).  Id. 
107. Allison Good, As Upstream Bankruptcies Loom, Oil and Gas Pipelines Brace for 




108. In re Extraction Oil & Gas, Inc., 622 B.R. 581 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020); In re Southland 
Royalty Co. LLC, 623 B.R. 64 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020); In re Chesapeake Energy Corp., 622 
B.R. 274 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2020).  
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were executory contracts subject to rejection, or were instead real 
property covenants burdening the debtors' mineral interests.  Before 
analyzing those cases, it is important to first understand the progression 
of both case law and dedication language in gathering agreements that 
led to such hotly contested litigation and three significant rulings in 2020. 
III.  IN RE SABINE OIL & GAS CORPORATION: GATHERING AGREEMENTS AS 
EXECUTORY CONTRACTS 
From approximately 2011 through mid-2014, United States crude 
oil prices were favorable, and often exceeded $100 per barrel.109  Towards 
the end of 2014, however, prices precipitously dropped as global 
production exceeded demand due in part to considerably increased 
production by United States' shale oil producers.110  As prices declined, 
many upstream entities filed for bankruptcy relief as production became 
unprofitable.111  One such entity was Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation 
(“Sabine”).112 
A. Sabine's Contractual Dedications 
Prior to filing for bankruptcy relief, Sabine, an upstream 
exploration and production company, entered into gathering agreements 
with HPIP Gonzales Holdings, LLC (“HPIP”) and Nordheim Eagle Ford 
Gathering, LLC (“Nordheim”), its midstream counterparties, for the 
collection, processing, and transportation of oil, gas, gas condensate, and 
water produced from Sabine's wells.113  Sabine's gathering agreements 
with HPIP and Nordheim were very similar.  In each Nordheim gathering 
agreement Sabine “dedicate[d] for gathering and dehydration … all [gas 
and condensate] produced and saved … from wells … located within the 
 
109. Hanna Breul, Crude Oil Prices Down Sharply in Fourth Quarter of 2014, U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Jan. 6, 2015), 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=19451 [https://perma.cc/4TM3-NLY5].  
110. Id. 
111. Matt Egan, U.S. Oil Bankruptcies Spike 379%, CNN BUSINESS (Feb. 11, 2016, 10:59 
AM), https://money.cnn.com/2016/02/11/investing/oil-prices-bankruptcies-spike/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZQN6-7YUK].  
112. In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 550 B.R. 59, 62 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016), aff'd, 567 
B.R. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), aff'd, 734 F. App'x 64 (2d Cir. 2018). 
113. In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 567 B.R. 869, 872 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), aff'd, 734 F. App'x 
64 (2d Cir. 2018). 
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Dedicated Area…”114  As summarized by the court, the Nordheim 
gathering agreements obligated Sabine to deliver “all of the gas and 
condensate it produced from a particular area to Nordheim.”115  In 
addition, the Nordheim agreements contemplated an additional 
conveyance of land from Sabine to Nordheim on which Norheim would 
construct its gathering facilities and pipelines.116 
Under the HPIP agreements, “HPIP agreed to perform gathering 
services with respect to all of the oil, gas, and water produced by Sabine 
from a 'Dedicated Area' over which Sabine held certain leases, and to 
construct the facilities required for those services.”117  As a key part of 
those agreements, Sabine “dedicate[d] and commit[ted] to the 
performance of this Agreement and the Leases and all of [Sabine]'s 
owned or controlled Production produced and saved from [Sabine]'s 
operated Wells located on the Leases” and “covenant[ed] to deliver the 
same to [HPIP].”118 
Under the Nordheim and HPIP agreements, the parties agreed 
that Sabine would retain title to the mineral leases in question, but that 
each gathering agreement established a “real right and covenant running 
with the lands and the leasehold interests” covered by the dedication, and 
that the gathering agreements would be “binding on the parties' 
successors.”119 
B. The Rejection Battleground: Covenant Running with the Land 
or Executory Contract? 
Two months after filing for bankruptcy relief, Sabine moved to 
reject the Nordheim gathering agreements as economically 
disadvantageous executory contracts.120  After preliminary hearings, 
Sabine's motion was converted into an adversary proceeding—a full-
fledged lawsuit in bankruptcy court—to litigate whether the gathering 
 
114. Id.   
115. See id.  
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. (emphasis added). 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 873; In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 550 B.R. 59, 61–62 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016).  
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agreements were executory contracts subject to rejection, or covenants 
running with the land binding on the debtor and its successors.121   
As explained by the court in Sabine, the distinction between 
whether dedication language in a gathering agreement establishes a real 
or personal property interest “is significant, because if the agreements 
constitute real covenants that run with the land they are not 'executory 
contracts' and the Bankruptcy Court does not have authority to approve 
their rejection under 11 U.S.C. § 365(a).”122  The Sabine courts 
recognized that determining whether an agreement created real property 
interest was a matter of state law.123  As a result, the New York courts 
complied with the choice of law provisions of each of the gathering 
agreements and applied Texas law.124   
Under Texas law, a covenant, like a dedication in a gathering 
agreement, runs with the land if: (1) it touches and concerns the land; (2) 
it relates to a thing in existence or specifically binds the parties and their 
assigns; (3) it is intended by the original parties to run with the land; and 
(4) the successor to the burden has notice.125  In Sabine, the parties agreed 
that the gathering agreements satisfied the second, third, and fourth 
elements of the Texas “running with the land” test.126  As a result, the 
Sabine courts focused on the first element, and whether, while not 
expressly enumerated, the Texas test also requires “horizontal privity” 
between the parties to the purported covenant running with the land.127 
 
121. Sabine, 550 B.R. at 61–62.  
122. In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 734 F. App'x 64, 65 (2d Cir. 2018).  
123. Id. at 65–66 (“Property interests are created and defined by state law.  Unless some 
federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason why such interests should be 
analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy 
proceeding.”) (citing Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979)).  
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 66 (citing Inwood N. Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Harris, 736 S.W.2d 632, 635 
(Tex. 1987)).  
126. Id.  
127. Id. 
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1.  Horizontal Privity 
Horizontal privity is an element required to establish that a 
covenant runs with the land in many states.128  In Sabine, the Second 
Circuit explains horizontal privity as follows:  
 
In order for the parties to the original agreement to have 
been in horizontal privity with one another, there must 
have been some common interest in the land other than 
the purported covenant itself at the time it was executed.  
Horizontal privity typically exists when the original 
covenanting parties make their covenant in connection 
with the conveyance of an estate in fee from one of the 
parties to the other. The covenant and the conveyance 
must be made at the same time, although no continuing 
mutual relationship to the affected land is needed. 129  
In other words, a conveyance of the property subject to the encumbrance 
must occur at the time of the creation of the encumbrance, or the 
encumbrance—the covenant—does not run with the land.130 
HPIP and Nordheim vehemently argued that two leading Texas 
Supreme Court cases failed to list horizontal privity as an element of the 
“running with the land” test.131  Though recognizing a growing trend 
“towards the abolition of the horizontal privity requirement,” the Second 
Circuit found Texas authority requiring horizontal privity, and that no 
later Texas case eliminated the requirement.132  
 
128. See, e.g., In re Murray Energy Holdings Co., Case No. 19-56885, 2020 WL 4037248, 
at * 11 (S.D. Ohio July 14, 2020) (applying West Virginia law); Flying Diamond Oil Corp. 
v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618, 623 (Utah 1989)) (applying Utah law); Noyles v. 
McDonnell, 398 P.2d 838 (Okla. 1965) (applying Oklahoma law); Jackson Hole Racquet Club 
Resort v. Teton Pines Ltd. P’ship, 839 P.2d 951, 958 (applying Wyoming law); Taylor v. 
Melton, 274 P.2d 977, 988–89 (Colo. 1954) (applying Colorado law). 
129. In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 734 F. App'x 64, 66 (2d Cir. 2018). 
130. See id. 
131. In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 550 B.R. 59, 68 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (recognizing 
that HPIP and Nordheim’s argued that neither Inwood nor Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf 
Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. 1982), among others, expressly include horizontal privity 
as an element necessary to establish a covenant running with the land). 
132. Sabine, 734 Fed. App’x. at 66–67 (“It would be improper for us to read a traditional 
requirement of real covenants out of Texas state law when there is no Texas law instructing 
courts to do so.  Accordingly, we agree with the bankruptcy court and find that horizontal 
privity remains a requirement of Texas real covenants.”) (citation omitted).   
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The Sabine courts then analyzed whether there was evidence of 
horizontal privity in the HPIP and Nordheim gathering agreements.  
When analyzing those agreements, the Sabine court noted that the 
agreements dedicated interests in minerals that were “produced and 
saved.”133  The court further observed that the term “produced and saved” 
referred only to “minerals extracted from the ground.”134  Moreover, the 
terms of each gathering agreement expressly disclaimed the sale, transfer, 
or assignment of Sabine's interest in its mineral leases.135  The court in 
Sabine ruled that, as a result, there was no conveyance of an interest in 
Sabine's minerals in the gathering agreement to go along with the pledges 
in the dedication.136  With no concurrent conveyance of any real property 
interest purportedly burdened by the covenant, the covenant could not run 
with the land.137   
2.  Touch and Concern the Land 
Having determined that horizontal privity is a necessary element 
for a covenant running with the land under Texas law, and that the 
gatherers failed to prove it, the Second Circuit did not address the first 
element of Texas's “running with the land” test.138  The lower courts did, 
however, and determined that the HPIP and Nordheim agreements did 
not touch and concern the land.139  The district court noted that Texas 
courts apply two tests when determining whether a covenant touches and 
concerns the land: 
 
First, a covenant touches and concerns the land if it 
affects the nature, quality or value of the thing demised, 
independently of collateral circumstances, or if it affects 
the mode of enjoying it.  Second, a covenant touches and 
concerns the land either if the promisor's legal relations 
in respect to the land in question are lessened or if the 
 
133. Sabine, 550 B.R. at 66. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 70 and n.53. 
136. Sabine, 734 Fed. Appx. at 66 (adopting bankruptcy court’s analysis). 
137. Id. at 67. 
138. Id. 
139. In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 567 B.R. 869, 877 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). 
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promisee's legal relations in respect to that land are 
increased.140 
Meeting either of the tests satisfies the “touches and concerns the land” 
element of the “running with the land” test.141 
In finding that the agreements did not “touch and concern the 
land” the district court again noted that the dedications in the gathering 
agreements pertained only to extracted minerals, and that nothing in the 
agreements would enable HPIP or Nordheim to interfere in any way with 
Sabine's in-ground minerals.142  Moreover, the district court noted that 
even if the agreements made Sabine's mineral interests “more or less 
valuable, depending on the price of hydrocarbons and the market rates for 
gather …those factors are clearly collateral …and would affect the value 
of any oil-producing land.”143  The agreements therefore failed the first 
“touches and concerns” test. 
The district court similarly rejected HPIP and Nordheim's 
contention that the agreements lessened Sabine's “legal relations in 
respect to the land in question” or increased the gatherer's “legal relations 
in respect to” the land in question.144  While the court issued a detailed 
ruling addressing each of HPIP and Nordheim's legal arguments, its 
reasoning is straightforward and simple: the agreements dedicated only 
extracted minerals, which is personal property and, as a result, there is no 
land—or any other real property interest—in question.145  The 
agreements, as written, could not therefore affect the parties' legal 
interests in Sabine's in-ground minerals.146  Thus, even if the Sabine 
courts did not apply horizontal privity, the gatherers could still not 
establish that the agreements were covenants running with the land under 
Texas law. 
 
140. Id. at 874. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 876–77. 
143. Id. at 877. 
144. Id. at 876. 
145. Id. at 874–75. 
146. See id. 
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C. Sabine Takeaway: The Importance of Extracted Minerals 
Fundamentally, the Sabine decisions all hinged on the fact that 
the gathering agreements in question pledged only minerals that were 
“produced and saved” from dedicated leases.147  The gatherers could not 
establish horizontal privity because Sabine never conveyed any interests 
in its in-ground minerals.148  Moreover, the gathering agreements 
contained express language stating that Sabine was not transferring any 
title to its mineral leases or in-ground minerals.149  Further, the gathering 
agreements did not bestow on HPIP or Nordheim any ability to extract 
minerals from Sabine's wells or to affect Sabine's production volume.150  
Taken as a whole, Sabine merely promised that it would allow HPIP and 
Nordheim to process and transport its extracted minerals for a contractual 
fee.  The agreements did not give rise to any covenant running with any 
land or other real property interest. 
IV.  CLOSING THE LOOPHOLE: IN RE BADLANDS ENERGY, INC. & IN RE ALTA 
MESA RESOURCES, INC. 
A. Drafting Dynamics: “Curing” the Personal Property Problem 
In the aftermath of Sabine, midstream gatherers took affirmative 
steps to protect their interests by drafting around the “produced and 
saved” language that led to Sabine's rejection of the HPIP and Nordheim 
agreements.151  Wamsutter LLC, a midstream gatherer referred to as 
“Williams” in its agreements, presents a prime example because its 
gathering agreements were later the subject of litigation in the In re 
 
147. In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 550 B.R. 59, 66–68 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
148. Id. at 68–70. 
149. Id. at 66–68. 
150. In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 567 B.R. 869, 876 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). 
151. Mark L. Jones et al., Bankruptcy Courts Contemplate Debtors' Rejection of Real 
Property Covenants in Midstream Contracts, LEXOLOGY (Dec. 3, 2020), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=353cd8c2-6720-424c-ad4b-756fac28d575 
[https://perma.cc/4YU9-E5Y4] (“Over the past four years, midstream firms have struggled to 
adapt their long-standing practices and adjust their long-held expectations, which were 
fundamentally disrupted by the outcome of the landmark bankruptcy case, In re Sabine Oil & 
Gas. Midstream providers have since developed and relied on certain mechanisms and 
carefully drafted contract language in order to bind upstream companies and their successors 
in interest to obligations and restrictions contained of midstream agreements.”).   
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Southland Royalty Company LLC bankruptcy case.152  Wamsutter's first 
agreement, known as the L60 gathering agreement, is dated June 1, 2016 
and likely drafted before the issuance of the Sabine bankruptcy court's 
ruling just weeks prior.153  The “Shipper's Dedication” contained in the 
L60 gathering agreement simply states: “Shipper dedicates Shipper's Gas 
within the Area of Interest described in Exhibit B to Williams for 
Gathering, Processing, Dehydrating and Treating.”154  Given the 
simplicity of the language, it would be hard to imagine the Sabine court 
determining that the dedication or agreement established a covenant 
running with the land. 
The second gathering agreement, known as the L63 gathering 
agreement, became effective November 1, 2018, months after the Second 
Circuit affirmed Sabine's rejection of the HPIP and Nordheim 
agreements.155  The “Shipper's Dedication” contained in the L63 is 
considerably more expansive, and states, in pertinent part: 
 
Shipper dedicates to the performance of this Agreement 
the Dedicated Properties and Dedicated Gas and grants to 
Williams the exclusive right to Gather, Process, 
Dehydrate and Treat the Produced Dedicated Gas 
(“Dedication”).  This Dedication shall be a covenant 
running with the land under applicable law and binding 
on the respective successors and assigns of the interests 
of Shipper and its Affiliates in and to the Dedicated 
Properties and Dedicated Gas.  If applicable law requires 
any amendment or modification to this Agreement for 
this Dedication to be treated as an enforceable covenant 
running with the land, the parties will promptly enter into 
any such addendum or modification.  Gatherer may file 
memoranda of this Agreement substantially in the form 
of Exhibit “J” in local land records from time to time in 
 
152. In re Southland Royalty Co. LLC, 623 B.R. 64, 71–72 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020). 
153. See First Amended Complaint for Avoidance and Related Declaratory Relief at 
Exhibit A Gas Gathering, Processing, Dehydrating and Treating Agreement dated June 1, 
2016 between Wamsutter LLC and Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC, In re Southland Royalty 
Co. LLC 623 B.R. 64 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 13, 2020) [hereinafter “Wamsutter L60 
Agreement”].  
154. Id. at Ex. A § 1.1. 
155. See id. at Ex. B.  
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its discretion, and Shipper will promptly enter into any 
such memoranda upon request.156 
It is abundantly clear from the plain language of the L63 dedication that 
Wamsutter, the gatherer, intended the agreement to be a covenant running 
with the land.  
The definitions of “Dedicated Properties” and “Dedicated Gas” 
further illustrate Wamsutter's efforts to concretely establish a covenant 
running with the land after Sabine.  Dedicated Properties “means all 
interests owned or Controlled by Shipper …during the term of this 
Agreement in oil, Gas or mineral leases covering lands …within the 
Dedication Area.”157  The term Dedicated Gas means “all Gas owned or 
Controlled by Shipper …in and under the Dedicated Properties before it 
has been produced ….”158  Wamsutter makes clear that Southland is 
agreeing to dedicate Wamsutter an interest in its minerals that are in the 
ground in an effort to “touch and concern” the land, that both parties 
intend to create a covenant running with the land, and that the covenant 
is binding on all successors and assigns. 
Like Wamsutter, other midstream companies similarly amended 
gathering agreements in an effort to ensure they established covenants 
running with the land.159  Those efforts were, at least for a while, 
vindicated.  In the years following Sabine, courts issued two impactful 
rulings suggesting that with careful drafting, gathering agreements could 
indeed establish real property interests in favor of midstream gatherers.160   
B. In re Alta Mesa Resources: Covenant Running with Land161 
On September 11, 2019, Alta Mesa Holdings, LP and Oklahoma 
Energy Acquisitions, LP (collectively “Alta Mesa”) filed petitions for 
bankruptcy relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.162  Alta 
 
156. Id. at Ex. B § 1.1(a) (emphasis added). 
157. Id. at Ex. J § 1(g). 
158. Id. at Ex. J § 1(f) (emphasis added). 
159. Jones et al., supra note 151. 
160. In re Badlands Energy, Inc., 608 B.R. 854 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2019); In re Alta Mesa 
Resources, Inc., 613 B.R. 90 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2019).  
161. Unless otherwise noted herein, the definitions and meanings of terms provided in this 
section IV.C. shall not apply to other sections of this article.   
162. Alta Mesa, 613 B.R. at 90, 95. 
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Mesa was an upstream oil and gas exploration and production 
company.163  In 2015, Alta Mesa entered into oil and gas gathering 
agreements with a midstream counterparty, Kingfisher Midstream, LLC 
(“Kingfisher”), to ensure it could take its produced minerals to market.164   
In each of the Kingfisher gathering agreements, Alta Mesa 
dedicated to Kingfisher “all Interests within the Dedicated Area” which, 
in context, meant all of Alta Mesa's “produced hydrocarbons.”165  The 
agreements also (1) conveyed to Kingfisher “any easement or rights-of-
way for purposes of constructing, owning, operating, repairing, replacing 
and maintaining” any portion of the gathering systems, (2) declared that 
the agreements were “covenants running with the land,” and (3) required 
the parties to cause any successors to acknowledge the dedications and 
agreements in writing.166   
On December 1, 2016—months after Sabine—Alta Mesa and 
Kingfisher entered into amendments to the gathering system.167  The 
amendments expanded the gathering agreements to include additional 
interests and the development of the Kingfisher gathering agreement.168  
Significantly, the amendments also incorporated a “Conveyance of 
Transportation Right, which the parties intended to be a conveyance of a 
portion of [Alta Mesa's] real property interests.”169  That right constituted 
“the sole and exclusive right to transport [oil and gas] produced from” 
Alta Mesa's dedicated interests.170  
Unfortunately for Alta Mesa, the Kingfisher gathering 
agreements required payment of what Alta Mesa described as exorbitant 
fees.171  After filing for bankruptcy relief, Alta Mesa promptly moved to 
reject the Kingfisher gathering agreements as executory contracts, 
 
163. Id. at 95. 
164. Id. at 95-96. 
165. Id. at 96, 103. 
166. Id. at 96. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 97 (internal quotations omitted). 
170. Id. 
171. See id. at 98 (“At the heart of this dispute is Alta Mesa's belief that its owners, sitting 
on both sides of the negotiation table, agreed to pay Kingfisher exorbitant gathering fees.  
According to Alta Mesa, its value as a going concern will increase if it is able to renegotiate 
its gathering arrangements, either with Kingfisher or a third party.”).   
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determining that doing so would improve its prospects of 
reorganization.172  
The Kingfisher gathering agreements each related to operations 
in Oklahoma, and, as a result, the Alta Mesa court applied Oklahoma law 
to determine whether the gathering agreements were covenants running 
with the land.173  As the Alta Mesa court detailed, three factors are 
required to create a real property covenant that runs with the land under 
Oklahoma law: (1) the burden or benefit must “touch and concern” the 
land; (2) there must be privity of estate between the party claiming the 
benefit and the party upon whom the burden rests; and (3) the original 
covenanting parties must have intended to bind successors.174  The court 
notes that in Oklahoma, “[r]eal property covenants are those that are so 
connected to the underlying land that the benefit and burden pass to 
successors by operation of law.”175  Oklahoma law does not require any 
“magic words” to create a real property covenant but instead focuses on 
the intent of the covenanting parties.176   
It is important to note that the court in Alta Mesa recognized 
repeatedly that, like Sabine, the dedications in the Kingfisher gathering 
agreements involved only “produced” minerals.177 Further, the court 
recognized that the test for determining whether a covenant runs with the 
land in Oklahoma mirrors the Texas test applied in Sabine.178 Even so, in 
a scathing review of Sabine, the Alta Mesa court distinguished the facts 
between the cases and ruled that the Kingfisher gathering agreements 
were covenants running the with land and not subject to rejection.179 
 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at 99. 
174. Id. at 99–100. 
175. Id. at 100. 
176. Id. 
177. See id. at 96–97, 103–04. 
178. Id. at 101. 
179. See id. at 102 (“The Court assumes that unique facts in Sabine led to that court's 
conclusions.  To the extent that the pronouncements in Sabine were intended to be 
generalized, this Court must reject them.”); see also id. at 103 (“An oil and gas lease is 
distinguishable from a fee simple mineral estate.  Although over-lapping in many respects, a 
fee mineral estate contains a separate collection of rights. . . . Unlike in Sabine, where that 
court focused its inquiry on a fee mineral estate, the relevant starting point here is Alta Mesa's 
leasehold interest. . . . Sabine drew a distinction between covenants concerning the surface 
estate and those that concern the mineral estate.  That distinction is far from semantic.  An oil 
and gas lease contemplates extraction of hydrocarbons for profit.  All of the property interests 
associated with an oil and gas lease are necessary for the lessee to successfully explore and 
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1.  Diverging from Sabine: Privity of Estate 
The court in Alta Mesa recognized that in Oklahoma, as in Texas, 
“privity requires that a covenant be made in conjunction with a 
conveyance of property.”180  Instead of applying Sabine's privity analysis, 
however, the court in Alta Mesa rejected it.  In Sabine, the court refused 
to find privity even though Sabine conveyed surface rights and easements 
to HPIP and Nordheim at the time it pledged its produced and saved 
minerals.181  The court reasoned that because the surface and mineral 
estates are separate under Texas law, the conveyance of surface rights 
was inadequately tied to Sabine's mineral interests.182   
In Alta Mesa, the court reached the opposite result.  As detailed 
by Judge Isgur, a surface interest arising out of a mineral lease is integral 
to the mineral interests arising out of the lease: 
 
[T]he easements conveyed to Kingfisher a possessory 
interest in the leasehold estate.  The surface easement is 
integrally tied to the purpose of an oil and gas lease.  The 
conveyance of the easements to Kingfisher is enough to 
show horizontal privity . . . . Alta Mesa's surface 
easements spring directly from its leasehold mineral 
interest.  Because a surface easement is crucial 
component of an oil and gas lease, the Court does not 
view the conveyance as creating privity only with respect 
to the surface estate.183   
In short, because surface and mineral estates under a mineral lease are so 
interconnected, the conveyance of a surface interest was sufficient to 
satisfy the privity element with regard to the mineral interest.184  In so 
ruling, Judge Isgur reframed the “produced and saved” issue of Sabine; 
dedicating only produced minerals could still create a covenant running 
 
produce his reserves.  Those lease-hold interests, targeted at the production of hydrocarbons, 
are the real property interests which the Alta Mesa gathering agreements involve.”).  
180. Id. at 101. 
181. In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 550 B.R. 59, 69 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
182. Id. 
183. Alta Mesa, 613 B.R. at 106. 
184. See id. 
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with the land when there was a concurrent conveyance of a real property 
interest in the surface estate tied to the produce minerals.  
2.  Diverging from Sabine: Touch and Concern 
In addition to finding privity, the Alta Mesa court also held that 
the gathering agreements touched and concerned Alta Mesa's mineral 
interests.185  For a covenant to touch and concern real property, there must 
be “a logical connection between the benefit to be derived from 
enforcement of the covenant and the property.”186  According to Judge 
Isgur, “a covenant touches and concerns the land when it requires 
performance of a physical act upon the land which directly benefits the 
landowner …. If the value of the owner's interest in the land itself is 
affected by the covenant, either positively or negatively, the covenant 
touches and concerns the land.”187 
Applying that analysis, the court noted that on the one hand, 
Kingfisher used the surface easement Alta Mesa conveyed in order to 
build a gathering system that enhanced the value of Alta Mesa's leases by 
facilitating delivery of its minerals to market.188  On the other hand, the 
court recognized that the gathering agreements imposed “costs and 
delivery restrictions on produced hydrocarbons, which diminish the value 
of Alta Mesa's unproduced reserves.”189  Moreover, the agreements 
materially affected Alta Mesa's rights to its minerals.  While it could 
choose when and if to drill, it had no choice but to deliver its produced 
minerals to Kingfisher.190   
As in its “privity” analysis, the Alta Mesa court also focused on 
the interconnectedness of surface and mineral rights under a mineral 
lease.191  According to the court, a mineral lease consists of surface and 
mineral interests, and “[a]ll of the property interests associated with an 
oil and gas lease are necessary for the lessee to successfully explore and 
produce his reserves.  Those leasehold interests, targeted at the 
production of hydrocarbons, are the real property interests which the Alta 
 
185. Id. at 102. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
188. Id. at 103–04. 
189. Id. at 102. 
190. Id. at 104. 
191. Id. at 103. 
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Mesa gathering agreements involve.”192  Accordingly, a conveyance from 
Alta Mesa to Kingfisher of surface rights for the construction of a 
gathering system inherently burdened and related to Alta Mesa's mineral 
interests under affected mineral leases.  After all, the court reasoned, 
“[w]ithout the surface easement, [a] [mineral] lessee cannot capture 
reserve hydrocarbons.”193 Development of the surface for a gathering 
system therefore inherently touched and concerned Alta Mesa's mineral 
interests under related mineral leases, satisfying the second element of 
the “runs with the land” test.194  
3.  Intent to Bind Successors 
  None of the substantive cases addressing whether a debtor can 
reject a gathering agreement in bankruptcy turn on the issue of whether 
parties to a gathering agreement intend to bind successors.  In almost 
every case, the issue of intent is either agreed or determined by the 
express terms of the agreement.195  As a result, this article focuses on 
whether the gathering agreements addressed in each key decision touch 
and concern the land and whether privity exists between the parties to the 
gathering agreements 
4.  Diverging from Sabine: Liberal Creation of Covenants Running with 
the Land 
The Alta Mesa court's “privity” and “touch and concern” analyses 
presented a major departure from Sabine.  As illustrated in the Wamsutter 
dedications provided above and by Kingfisher's effort to establish a 
conveyance of an interest in Alta Mesa's minerals in the gathering 
agreement amendments, midstream gatherers focused on curing the 
“produced and saved” language in the aftermath of Sabine.196  The court 
in Alta Mesa, however, rendered that largely unnecessary.   
 
192. Id. 
193. Id. at 104. 
194. Id. 
195. See In re Badlands Energy, Inc., 608 B.R. 854, 870–71 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2019); Alta 
Mesa, 613 B.R. at 106–07; In re Chesapeake Energy Corp., 622 B.R. 282 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 
Jan. 16, 2020); In re Southland Royalty Co. LLC 623 B.R. 81 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 13, 2020); 
In re Extraction Oil & Gas, Inc., 622 B.R. 620 n.32 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020). 
196. See supra notes 157–60, 166–71, and the text associated therewith.  
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By focusing on the nature of mineral leases and the connection 
between surface and mineral estates under a mineral lease, the court in 
Alta Mesa promoted an exceptionally liberal analysis of the “privity” and 
“touch and concern” elements of the “runs with the land” test.  Applying 
Alta Mesa, a gathering agreement will be a covenant running with the 
land so long as: (1) the upstream party conveys an interest in the surface 
estate of pertinent mineral leases to the midstream party; (2) the upstream 
party dedicates the minerals from the mineral estates of those pertinent 
mineral leases to the midstream party; (3) the midstream party agrees to 
develop a gathering system on the conveyed surface interests; and (4) the 
parties intend the covenant to be binding on successors-in-interest.  It is 
abundantly clear from Judge Isgur's ruling that if he applied his reasoning 
to Sabine, the HPIP and Nordheim gathering agreements would be 
covenants running with the land.197 
The liberal creation of covenants running with the land set forth 
in Alta Mesa creates potential underwriting issues for energy lenders.  A 
reserve-based lender, for instance, may have loaned money to an 
upstream company based on its mineral reserves.198  As a practical matter, 
most reserve-based loans prohibit upstream borrowers from granting 
non-lender parties liens or other encumbrances on the lender's 
collateral—the borrower's mineral interests.199  In Sabine, for example, 
the bankruptcy court noted that Sabine's Second Amended and Restated 
Credit Agreement precluded Sabine from granting Nordheim and HPIP 
liens on Sabine's mineral interests.200  An upstream borrower's entry into 
a gathering agreement that conveyed a midstream counterparty a lien or 
other encumbrance on the borrower's minerals would almost certainly 
breach any applicable credit agreement and trigger a default.201 
Moreover, because a covenant running with the land cannot be 
rejected in bankruptcy, an upstream debtor saddled with a seriously 
disadvantageous gathering agreement is less likely to successfully 
 
197. See generally In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 550 B.R. 59, 66–68 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2016). 
198. See, e.g., Southland, 623 B.R. at 97 n.134.  
199. See supra note 49, Adv. D.I. 238-1, Lenders' Post-Trial Memorandum of Law at ¶ 8–
13.   
200. Sabine, 550 B.R. at 67–68 n.41. 
201. See, e.g., id. (noting that under the applicable credit agreement, if Sabine had 
conveyed a real property interest in its minerals to Nordheim and HPIP, it would have 
triggered an Event of Default under Sabine’s credit agreement). 
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reorganize.  If the upstream debtor cannot reject a financially adverse 
gathering agreement, and its midstream counterparty refuses to 
restructure the terms of the agreement, the debtor may be forced to simply 
liquidate its assets.  Liquidation in a depressed oil and gas market may 
result in huge write downs for the lenders to an upstream borrower who 
has become undersecured due to market conditions.202   
Liquidation, however, may not even be a viable means of 
shedding a disadvantageous gathering agreement.  As another leading 
2019 energy lending case revealed, in some instances, even a sale free 
and clear of all liens, claims, and encumbrances under section 363 of the 
Bankruptcy Code might not extinguish a covenant running with the 
land.203  
C. In re Badlands: Covenant Running With Land204 
Badlands Energy, Inc. and its debtor subsidiaries (collectively, 
“Badlands”)205 filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings on August 11, 
2017, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Colorado.206  The Badlands opinion arose from an adversary proceeding 
filed by Monarch Midstream, LLC, f/k/a Monarch Natural Gas, LLC, 
(“Monarch”) concerning Badlands' ability to (1) reject its gas gathering 
agreement (the “GPA”) and saltwater disposal agreement (the “SWDA”) 
with Monarch and (2) sell certain oil and gas assets free and clear of those 
agreements.207   
Prior to bankruptcy, Badlands was a consolidated natural gas and 
petroleum exploration and production company that operated oil and gas 
 
202. See, e.g. Becky Yerak, Texas-Based Driller Arena Energy Files for Bankruptcy: The 
Gulf of Mexico Operator, Looking to Restructure More Than $1 Billion in Debt, Has a $64 
Million Deal to Sell Virtually All of Its Assets, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 21, 2020), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/texas-based-driller-arena-energy-files-for-bankruptcy-
11598036183 [https://perma.cc/G6BY-PHXU]; 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2018) (bifurcating claims 
of undersecured creditor into secured claim up to value of collateral, and undersecured claim 
for any remaining amount due and owing). 
203. See In re Badlands Energy, Inc., 608 B.R. 854 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2019). 
204. Unless otherwise noted herein, the definitions and meanings of terms provided in this 
section IV.B. shall not apply to other sections of this article.   
205. The Badlands debtors included Badlands Energy, Inc., f/k/a Gasco Energy, Inc.; 
Badlands Production Company, f/k/a Gasco Production Company; Badlands Energy-Utah, 
LLC; and Myton Oilfield Rentals, LLC.   
206. Badlands, 608 B.R. at 862.  
207. Id. at 860. 
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leasehold interests in Utah's Uinta Basin.208  In 2010, Badlands sold 
certain gas gathering and saltwater disposal facilities to Monarch, 
pursuant to an asset purchase agreement (the “Facilities APA”).209  The 
GPA and SWDA were executed contemporaneously with the Facilities 
APA—and amended from time to time thereafter—to establish terms of 
Badlands' continued use of the gathering and disposal facilities following 
the asset sale to Monarch.210  Monarch's obligation to close on the sale 
was conditioned on Badlands' execution of the GPA and SWDA.211     
In the GPA, Badlands dedicated its interests in certain gas 
reserves to Monarch and agreed that all gas produced from those reserves 
would be delivered exclusively through Monarch's gathering facilities.212  
The GPA dedication further stated that “[t]he dedication and commitment 
under this Agreement is a covenant running with the land.”213 The GPA 
also (1) contained a minimum volume commitment requiring Badlands 
to pay a fee to Monarch if a minimum volume of gas was not delivered 
to the gathering system each calendar quarter;  (2) granted Monarch a 
right-of-way and easement across the GPA Leases and adjoining lands 
for the purpose of installing and maintaining the gathering systems; (3) 
granted Monarch an irrevocable option to purchase a certain 50 acres of 
land; (4) included an anti-assignability provision; and (5) stated that the 
GPA bound and injured to the benefit of each party's successors and 
assigns.214     
Under the SWDA, Badlands committed to dispose all water 
produced from certain production areas through Monarch's saltwater 
disposal system and to pay fees to Monarch for the disposal and treatment 
 
208. Id. 
209. Id. at 861. 
210. Id. at 864–66. 
211. Id. at 866. 
212. Id. at 864.  The GPA dedication was of the “Dedicated Reserves,” which the GPA 
defined as “the interest of Producer in all Gas reserves in and under, and all Gas owned by 
Producer and produced or delivered from (i) the Leases and (ii) other lands within the AMI, 
whether now owned or hereafter acquired, along with the processing rights, subject to certain 
volume exclusions as described herein, and any and all additional right, title, interest, or claim 
of every kind and character of Producer or its Affiliates in (x) the Leases or (y) lands within 
the AMI, and Gas production therefrom, and all interests in any wells, whether now existing 
or drilled hereafter, on, or completed on, lands covered by a Lease or within the AMI . . . .”  
GPA, § 1.1, p. 2; see also Badlands, 608 B.R. at 864–65.   
213. Badlands, 608 B.R. at 864–65. 
214. Id. at 865–66. 
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of its produced water.215  Like the GPA, the SWDA stated that “[t]he 
commitment made by [Badlands] hereunder is a covenant running with 
the land.”216     
Three days into the bankruptcy case, Badlands filed a motion to 
sell certain oil and gas assets (the “Riverbend Assets”) to Wapiti Utah, 
LLC (“Wapiti Utah”) free and clear of the GPA and SWDA pursuant to 
section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code.217  Exhibit A to the Wapiti Utah 
Purchase and Sale Agreement expressly provided that “Wapiti Utah shall 
not assume any contracts with Monarch in connection with the purchase 
of the Riverbend Assets, including the GPA and SWDA.”218  In 
conjunction with the sale, Badlands sought to reject both the GPA and 
SWDA under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.219   
On October 23, 2017, two days before the sale hearing, Monarch 
filed its adversary complaint asserting that the GPA and SWDA were 
covenants running with the land and that, as a result, the Riverbend Assets 
could not be sold free and clear of those agreements.220  Oddly, Monarch 
also sought to have Wapiti Utah cure all prepetition monetary defaults 
under the Agreements, totaling $1.2 million, pursuant to section 365 of 
the Bankruptcy Code.221  Given the timing of Monarch's adversary 
proceeding, the court approved the Sale Motion and Wapiti Utah's 
Purchase and Sale Agreement subject to a later ruling as to whether the 
GPA and SWDA were covenants running with the land.222     
Wapiti Utah moved for a judgment on the pleadings in the 
adversary proceeding.223 In doing so, Wapiti Utah argued that: (1) the 
GPA and SWDA were rejected executory contracts; (2) neither the GPA 
 
215. Id. at 866. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. at 862–63. 
218. Id. at 863. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. 
221. Id.  The authors find Monarch’s cure demand very odd given the circumstances.  
Monarch would not be entitled to any cure payment under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code 
unless the GPA and SWDA were executory contracts and assumed by Badlands and assigned 
to Wapiti Utah.  See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b) (2018).  If they were executory contracts, however, 
Badlands could simply reject the GPA and SWDA as intended.  Simply put, the authors are 
unaware of any scenario under the Bankruptcy Code pursuant to which a claimant could 
receive a cure payment under section 365 for something other than an executory contract 
otherwise subject to rejection.   
222. Badlands, 608 B.R. at 863.  
223. Id. 
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nor SWDA satisfied the elements necessary to be covenants running with 
the land; and (3) even if the agreements were covenants running with the 
land, they were stripped from the Riverbend Assets as a result of 
Badlands' “free and clear” sale under section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy 
Code.224 
In response, Monarch filed a motion for summary judgment 
seeking a determination that the GPA and SWDA were covenants 
running with the land and that such covenants were not “interests” that 
could be stripped from the Riverbend Assets through a sale under section 
363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code.225   
Although the GPA and SWDA were both governed by Colorado 
law, the court in Badlands applied Utah law because “property interests 
are created and defined by state law, and the Riverbend assets are located 
in Utah.”226  Utah law applies substantially the same test as Texas and 
Oklahoma to determine whether a covenant runs with the land.  
Covenants running with the land must (1) “touch and concern” the land; 
(2) the parties must have intended that the covenant run with the land; 
and (3) and there must be privity of estate between the parties.227 
1.  Badlands: Touch and Concern 
Utah's “touch and concern” test is similar to the Texas test applied 
in Sabine and the Oklahoma test applied in Alta Mesa.  The court provides 
the following summary of the touch and concern inquiry under Utah Law:  
 
In Flying Diamond, the Utah Supreme Court recognized 
a broad test for touch-and-concern that does not require a 
physical effect upon the land but rather, requires a court 
to evaluate whether a covenant “enhances the land's value 
[on the benefit side], and for the burden side, whether it 
diminishes the land's value.” … “[A]ll that must be shown 
 
224. Id. at 863–64; see also 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (debtor “may sell property . . . free and clear 
of any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate . . .” if any provision of (f)(1-
5) is satisfied) (emphasis added). 
225. Badlands, 608 B.R. at 864. 
226. Id. at 867. 
227. Id. (citing Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618, 623 (Utah 
1989)).  Under Utah law, because a covenant running with the land concerns real property, it 
must also be in writing and satisfy the statute of frauds.  Id. 
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for a covenant to run with the land is that it 'be of such 
character that its performance or nonperformance will so 
affect the use, value or enjoyment of the land itself that it 
must be regarded as an integral part of the property.'“228 
Put another way, “to touch and concern the land, a covenant must bear 
upon the use and enjoyment of the land and be of the kind that the owner 
of an estate or interest in land may make because of his ownership 
right.”229  The Utah “touch and concern” test is objective and should be 
conducted “without reference to the subjective mindset of original 
covenantors.”230   
Here, as in Alta Mesa, the court took a generally holistic analysis 
of whether the GPA and SWDA touched and concerned the land: 
 
Here, [Badlands'] interests in the Leases are diminished 
by the [gathering agreements].  The burdens imposed 
under the [gathering agreements] directly affect 
[Badlands'] use and enjoyment of its interests in the 
Leases in the [dedicated area]…the purpose of the 
[gathering agreements] is to compensate Monarch for the 
burdens associated with acquiring and operating the 
Gathering System, which is connected to [Badlands'] 
Wells located on the Leases via the Receipt Points.231   
The character of the covenant was therefore such “that its performance or 
nonperformance will so affect the use value or enjoyment of the land 
itself that it must be regarded as an integral party of the property.”232  It 
did not matter to the court that one of the objectives of the gathering 
agreements was to process and dispose of “produced gas.”  Instead, the 
court noted that, as a whole, the covenants affected the use and value of 
the mineral estates by connecting Badlands’ minerals to gathering 
systems that would enable them to be gathered and processed.233  
 
228. Id. at 868 (citing Flying Diamond, 776 P.2d at 624). 
229. Id. at 867. 
230. Id. at 867 (citing Stern v. Metro. Water Dist. of Salt Lake & Sandy, 274 P.3d 935, 946 
(Utah 2012)). 
231. Id. at 868. 
232. Id. at 870. 
233. Id. at 869. 
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Moreover, while the court disagreed with the Sabine ruling, it also 
factually distinguished Sabine in that Badlands’ dedications included real 
property interests in minerals “in and under” the surface estate.234  As a 
result, the court held that the covenants touched and concerned the land. 
2.  Badlands: Privity of Estate 
The Badlands decision is unique in part because it analyzes three 
potential types of privity under Utah law: vertical; mutual; and 
horizontal.235  According to the court, vertical privity exists between an 
original party and its successor.236  Wapiti Utah did not dispute its vertical 
privity with Badlands; it purchased Badlands' assets.237     
The court then held that mutual privity exists among parties with 
a continuing or simultaneous interest in the same property.238  In 
Badlands, the court established mutual privity for two key reasons.  First, 
the gathering agreements dedicated in ground minerals, not just produced 
minerals, to Monarch.239  While the dedication did not give Monarch a 
“fee estate” to the dedicated reserves, the court determined it was 
sufficiently based on an interest Monarch had in real property.240  Second, 
Monarch owned gathering and saltwater disposal systems and easements 
on the same lands burdened by Badlands/Wapiti Utah's mineral leases 
and dedicated reserves.241  Together, the substance of the parties' 
overlapping interests was sufficient to establish mutual privity.242   
The court next stated that horizontal privity exists under Utah law 
when original covenanting parties create a covenant in connection with a 
simultaneous conveyance of an estate.243  The facts in Badlands relating 
to horizontal privity are relatively unique because, in 2010, Badlands and 
Monarch entered into the Facilities APA pursuant to which Badlands 
conveyed a gathering system to Monarch concurrently with the parties' 
 
234. Id. 








243. Id. at 871. 
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execution of the GPA and SWDA, which contained the dedications in 
question.244  Citing the parties' 2010 conveyance and dedications, the 
Badlands court found horizontal privity between Badlands and 
Monarch.245 
Citing Sabine, Wapiti Utah argued that Monarch could not 
establish horizontal privity because (1) the GPA and SWDA did not 
actually convey real property interests, but merely pledged to deliver 
extracted minerals, (2) Monarch's surface easements did not burden 
Badlands' mineral interests.246 Rejecting Wapiti Utah's argument, the 
court reiterated that unlike Sabine, the dedications in question included 
in-ground minerals, not produced and saved minerals.247  While the court 
noted that the dedications therefore burdened the mineral estate, it did not 
go so far as to say that the dedication constituted a conveyance of an 
interest in the in-ground minerals.248  Even so, taken in conjunction with 
Badlands' conveyance of the gathering system and surface easements, the 
net effect was sufficient to establish horizontal privity.249   
3.  Badlands: Intent 
As in Sabine and Alta Mesa, the court spent little time analyzing 
the intent of the parties to create a covenant running with the land.  Both 
the GPA and SWDA explicitly stated that the “Dedication” and 
“Commitment” in those agreements were covenants running with the 
land.250  Wapiti Utah argued, however, that Monarch's failure to record 
the GPA's memorandum demonstrated a genuine dispute over the intent 
of the parties to create a covenant running with the land binding on 
successors.251  The court again rejected Wapiti Utah's argument, however, 
holding that “the failure to record implicates notice, not intent.”252  The 
court then ruled “[i]n light of the intent clearly expressed in the 
 
244. Id. at 861–62. 
245. Id. at 873. 




250. Id. at 870. 
251. Id. at 870–71. 
252. Id. 
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Agreements themselves, the Court concludes Monarch and [Badlands] 
intended the Agreements to run with the land….”253 
4.  Badlands: No Free and Clear Sale? An Underwriting Nightmare 
Having determined that the Agreements constituted real property 
covenants, one issue of relevance to this article remained before the court: 
whether a sale of assets subject to a covenant running with the land under 
section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code would be “free and clear” of the 
covenant.254  Section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor in 
possession “can only sell property of an estate free and clear of any 
interest under one” of five circumstances,255 two of which were at issue 
in Badlands: (i) “applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such 
property free and clear of such interest; … or [(ii)] such entity could be 
compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to accept a money 
satisfaction of such interest.”256    
The court in Badlands ruled that Wapiti Utah could not satisfy 
any element for a sale free and clear of Monarch's covenant running with 
the land for one simple reason:  under Utah law, a covenant running with 
the land is not an “interest” that can be extinguished under section 363(f) 
of the Bankruptcy Code.257  In Utah, the court explained, a covenant 
 
253. Id. at 870. 
254. The issue of whether Wapiti Utah was obligated to cure Badlands’ prepetition defaults 
under section 365(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, a remedy owed only to parties to an executory 
contract, was resolved as expected.  See supra note 221.  The court noted that if the covenants 
ran with the land, Monarch would not be party to any executory contract and so would be 
ineligible as a matter of law to receive cure payments under section 365(b).  As a result, 
Monarch would simply have a pre-petition unsecured claim against Badlands for the default 
and no recourse against Wapiti Utah.  Id. at 875–76.     
255. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2018). 
256. Badlands, 608 B.R. at 874 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(1)–(5)). 
257. Stating:  
 
Under Utah law, the nature of a covenant that runs with the land is such 
“that it must be regarded as an integral part of the property.” Lundeberg 
v. Dastrup, 28 Utah 2d 28, 497 P.2d 648, 650 (1972). Therefore, the 
Agreements are part of the bundle of sticks Wapiti Utah acquired when it 
purchased the Riverbend Assets, and they are not subject to elimination 
utilizing Section 363(f).  Similarly, this Court has previously held 
restrictions that run with the land are not “interests” to which Section 363 
applies:  Restrictions that run with the land “create equitable interests that 
do not compel a person to accept a monetary interest; thus, when 
restrictive covenants are involved, there is nothing that can force those 
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running with the land is something that, by its very nature “must be 
regarded as an integral part of the property.”258  As a result, Monarch's 
covenants running with the land were inherently “part of the bundle of 
sticks Wapiti Utah acquired when it purchased the Riverbend Assets, and 
they are not subject to elimination under Section 363(f).”259 
In any event, even if section 363(f) did apply to Monarch's 
covenants, the court reasoned, neither sections 363(f)(1) nor (f)(5) would 
apply.260  Quoting its own prior opinion, the Badlands court held that 
“restrictions that run with the land create equitable interests that do not 
compel a person to accept a monetary interest; thus, when restrictive 
covenants are involved, there is nothing that can force those who benefit 
from restrictive covenants to forego equitable relief in favor of a cash 
award.”261  Finally, quoting Sabine, the court issued a broad statement 
that “it is not possible for a debtor to reject a covenant that 'runs with the 
land' [under section 365], since such a covenant creates a property interest 
that is not extinguished in bankruptcy.”262  
 
who benefit from restrictive covenants to ‘forego [sic] equitable relief in 
favor of a cash award.’”  In re Lonesome Pine Holdings, LLC, Case No. 
10-34560 HRT (Bankr. D. Colo. Sept. 9, 2011), citing Skyline Woods 
Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Broekemeier, 276 Neb. 792, 758 N.W.2d 376, 
393 (2008) (property sold in bankruptcy subject to implied restrictive 
covenant running with the land requiring property only be used as a golf 
course) (further citations omitted); see also Gouveia v. Tazbir, 37 F.3d 
295, 299 (7th Cir. 1994); In re Banning Lewis Ranch Co., LLC), 532 B.R. 
335, 345–46 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2015); In re Oyster Bay Cove, Ltd., 161 
B.R. 338 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd, 196 B.R. 251 (E.D.N.Y. 
1996); In re 523 E. Fifth St. Housing Pres. Dev. Fund Corp., 79 B.R. 568 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
 
Id. at 874–75.  
258. Id. 
259. Id. 
260. Id. at 875 (“Even if the real covenants at issue were subject to Section 363(f), neither 
Section 363(f)(1) nor (f)(5) serve to strip the Riverbend Assets of the Agreements. Under 
applicable nonbankruptcy law, covenants that run with the land in Utah 'bind successive 
owners of the burdened or benefited land.' Stern v. Metro. Water Dist. of Salt Lake & Sandy, 
274 P.3d 935, 945 (Utah 2012) (citing Flying Diamond, 776 P.2d at 623). In other words, 
Section 363(f)(1) cannot be satisfied because Utah law does not permit sale of property free 
and clear of the covenants that run with it. Under Section 363(f)(5), Monarch could not be 
'compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to accept a money satisfaction of such interest' 
because the interests of Monarch are part of the Riverbend Assets themselves.”).   
261. Id. at 874 (quoting In re Lonesome Pine Holdings, LLC, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 5775, 
*1). 
262. Id. at 875 (quoting In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 567 B.R. 869, 874 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), 
aff'd, 734 F. App'x 64 (2d Cir. 2018)). 
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As a result of the court's ruling, Wapiti Utah purchased the 
Riverbend Assets subject to the preexisting terms and conditions of the 
GPA and SWDA.  The ruling's effects, however, are far broader. 
5.  A Liberal Application of the “Runs with the Land” Test Creates 
Uncertainty and Underwriting Nightmares 
The Badlands and Alta Mesa courts' ruling broadly expanded the 
Sabine court's application of the “runs with the land” test.  Courts 
following Badlands and Alta Mesa can go so far as to disregard whether 
dedications in gathering agreements address minerals in the ground or 
extracted minerals so long as there are other burdens on the upstream 
party's interest in its mineral estate.  As a result, a dedication of produced 
minerals from the leases of certain mineral estates and a concurrent grant 
of surface rights and easements on the surface estates of the leases would, 
under Alta Mesa, create a covenant running with the land.  That covenant, 
under Badlands would not be subject to elimination through a “free and 
clear” sale under section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
In the context of underwriting reserve-based loans to upstream 
exploration and production companies, the Badlands decision is a 
disaster.  In a typical reserve-based lending scenario like the one 
discussed above, an upstream exploration and production company 
borrows money and, in exchange, grants the lender a first priority lien on 
all of its mineral reserves, whether currently owned or acquired in the 
future.263  Later encumbrances are generally junior to the lender's 
interest.264  As a result, a lender must be made whole before any junior 
lienholder is paid anything.  If the upstream borrower defaults, its lender 
may typically foreclose and take possession of its collateral free and clear 
of junior encumbrances.265  Similarly, in bankruptcy, a lender would 
 
 
263. See, e.g., In re Southland Royalty Co. LLC, 623 B.R. 64, 97 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020) 
(“With respect to section 363(f)(1), Wyoming law allows a preexisting mortgage with priority 
over a later-created real property covenant to extinguish the covenant through foreclosure. 
The purpose is to protect the mortgagee by ensuring that upon foreclosure, the mortgagee 
acquires exactly such title as the mortgagor owned at the time the mortgage was executed. 
Wamsutter does not dispute Wyoming state law on this matter or the priority of the RBL 
Lenders' credit facilities or their foreclosure rights.”).  
264. Id.  
265. See, e.g., Burning Rock Energy LLC v. Pinnacle Gas Resources, Inc., 2007 WL 
9706009, at *4 (D. Wyo. Mar. 6, 2007) (applying Wyoming law). 
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typically have the right to credit bid its lien and purchase its collateral in 
bankruptcy free and clear of all objecting junior lienholders under section 
363(f)(1) or (f)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code.266   
After Badlands, however, lenders have little certainty of their 
ability to foreclose out and extinguish later-in-time encumbrances arising 
from gathering agreements.  That creates a real underwriting concern. 
When debtors seek to avoid gathering agreements in bankruptcy, it is 
typically because the terms are economically disadvantageous.  In Alta 
Mesa, for example, the gathering agreements saddled the debtor with 
excessive fees.267  If unavoidable, those fees may make the production of 
minerals infeasible.  Put simply, despite owning vast reserves, the terms 
of a gathering agreement may be so penal as to ensure that production 
results in net losses to the upstream counterparty.  An unavoidable 
adverse gathering agreement may therefore so detrimentally burden an 
upstream party's mineral interests as to render them worthless.  That, of 
course, jeopardizes a senior secured reserve-based lender's ability to 
recover in the event of a default by the upstream borrower.268 
In application, Badlands weakens an earlier-in-time secured 
lender's ability to recover against its collateral, because any foreclosure 
or similar sale process must remain subject to the economically 
disadvantageous gathering agreement.  If operating under such an 
agreement would result in a loss, the only party who may benefit from 
 
266. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (2018); In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892, 
900 (9th Cir. 2017) (applying 363(f)(1) where state foreclosure law allows elimination of 
junior encumbrances); In re Southland Royalty Co. LLC, 623 B.R. 64, 97–98 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2020)  
(citing Pinnacle for applicability of 363(f)(1) where state foreclosure law would allow 
elimination of junior encumbrance, noting 363(f)(5) is applicable where state law allows 
satisfaction of a claim through a money judgment, and citing Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 
539 U.S. 90, 98, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003) in support of interpretation of 
bankruptcy code); see, e.g., In re Gulf States Steel, Inc. of Ala., 285 B.R. 497, 508 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ala. 2002) (interpreting section 363(f)(5) to authorize sales of property free and clear of 
liens if trustee can point to other legal mechanisms that would extinguish liens).  But see Dishi 
& Sons v. Bay Condos LLC, 510 B.R. 696, 710 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (minority view holding that 
§ 363(f)(1) is only eligible if the property owner could bring an appropriate action under 
nonbankruptcy law) (citing In re Jaussi, 488 B.R. 456, 458 (Bankr. D.Colo.2013)). 
267.  In re Alta Mesa Res., Inc., 613 B.R. 90, 95 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2019). 
268. See Jesse S. Lotay & Yenmi Tang, Address at 46th Annual Ernest E. Smith Oil, Gas 
and Mineral Law Fundamentals and Institute: A Primer on Understanding Oil and Gas 
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the underlying reserves is the later-in-time gatherer, not the earlier-in-
time lender whose collateral must flow through the gatherer.  As 
discussed in detail below, this hypothetical is not idle speculation, but a 
harsh reality. 
V.  THE BACKLASH: REVISITING SABINE AND A CLOSER ANALYSES OF 
COVENANTS RUNNING WITH THE LAND 
Many economic and practical factors precipitated a wave of oil 
and gas bankruptcy filings in 2020.  Three of those bankruptcy cases 
involved struggling upstream companies that were parties to 
economically disadvantageous gathering agreements.269  As discussed 
below, two of the three cases rejected Alta Mesa and Badlands, 
determined that the gathering agreements were executory contracts, and 
enabled the bankrupt debtors to reject the gathering agreements under 
section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.270  While that may be cause for 
celebration to upstream companies and their lenders, the uncertainty 
arising from Badlands remains, and one court's ruling rejecting a 
gathering agreement suggests Alta Mesa remains alive and well. 
A. In re Extraction Oil & Gas, Inc.: Turning the Tide 
Extraction Oil & Gas, Inc. (and with its affiliates, “Extraction”) 
is an upstream exploration and production company that produces oil and 
related hydrocarbons from wells located in Colorado.271  In 2017, 
Extraction entered into a series of transportation agreements 
(“Transportation Agreements”) with various midstream counterparties 
(the “Gatherers”).272   
The Transportation Agreements generally contained expansive 
dedications that included “all interests that [Extraction] . . . now or 
 
269. In re Southland Royalty Co. LLC, 623 B.R. 64 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020); In re 
Chesapeake Energy Corp., 622 B.R. 274, 276 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2020); In re Extraction Oil 
& Gas, 622 B.R. 608, 614 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020). 
270. See infra sections V.A., V.B., and V.C.  
271. In re Extraction Oil & Gas, Inc., 622 B.R. 581, 584–86 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020) 
(providing detailed factual background regarding the debtor’s operations and gathering 
agreements, along with detailed legal analysis of covenant running with the land test); see 
also In re Extraction Oil & Gas, Inc., 622 B.R. 608 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020) (providing 
additional legal analysis on potential rejection of covenants even if they do run with the land). 
272. Extraction, 622 B.R. at 585–86. 
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hereafter owns, controls, acquires or has the right to market in Crude 
Petroleum of all formations in, under or attributable to the Dedication 
Area, and all interests in any wells, whether now existing or drilled 
hereafter . . . .”273  Certain of the Transportation Agreements made clear 
that the parties intended the dedications to run with the land.  For 
example, one Transportation Agreement expressly stated that “the 
dedication and commitment . . . shall be deemed an interest that runs with 
the land in the dedication Area . . . [Extraction] agrees to execute and 
deliver a memorandum . . . for each of [the applicable countries] to 
[Gatherer] for recording in the real property records of each such country 
. . . .”274  The Transportation Agreements also contained express 
provisions stating that they would inure to the benefit of the parties' 
successors-in-interest.275 
  The Transportation Agreements did note, however, that 
Extraction retained title to all minerals delivered to Gatherers, and that 
Extraction's minerals were free and clear of all liens, claims, and 
encumbrances other than Extraction's lender's liens.276  Further, 
Extraction did not grant any easement or rights-of-way to the Gatherers 
contemporaneously with the Transportation Agreements.277 
On August 14, 2020, Extraction filed for bankruptcy relief under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.278  Less than two months later, 
Extraction moved to reject the Transportation Agreements as executory 
contracts under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code and, shortly 
thereafter, filed an adversary proceeding seeking a declaratory judgment 
ruling that the Transportation Agreements were, in fact, executory 
contracts subject to rejection.279 
As the assets purportedly subject to the Gatherers’ covenant were 
located in Colorado, the Extraction court applied Colorado law.280  The 
court noted that Colorado law “disfavors the creation of covenants 
running with the land as a derogation of the common law's preference for 
 
273. Id. at 587–88. 
274. Id. at 588 (citing to Adv. D.I. 5-2 (filed under seal), Notice of Filing of Exhibits to 
Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit B at § 2.5).  
275. Id. at 593–94. 
276. Id. at 590–91. 
277. Id. at 586. 
278. Id. 
279. Id. 
280. Id. at 595. 
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free alienability of land.”281  As a result, the court determined that “any 
ambiguity concerning whether the terms of the Transportation 
Agreements created covenants running with the land would be resolved 
in favor of the unrestricted use of the land.”282 
To create a covenant running with the land under Colorado law, 
a party must prove three elements: (1) the covenant must touch and 
concern the land; (2) there must be privity of estate between the original 
covenanting parties; and (3) the parties must intend to create a covenant 
running with the land.283  In Extraction, the court ruled that the Gatherers 
failed to prove any of the three requisite elements and that, as a result, the 
Transportation Agreements could be rejected.284 
1.  Extraction: Touch and Concern 
For a covenant to touch and concern land under Colorado law, it 
must be “closely related to the estate in real property with which it is 
intended to run, its use, or enjoyment.”285  In this case, that “real property 
with which” the covenants purportedly ran was “Extraction's mineral 
estate.”286  The question was therefore whether the dedications and 
commitments in the Transportation Agreements touched and concerned 
Extraction's mineral interests.287   
The Gatherers, citing Badlands, argued that the dedication of in-
ground minerals in the Transportation Agreements necessarily touched 
and concerned the land.288  The court disagreed.  The court analyzed the 
Transportation Agreements and noted that they were, in their 
fundamental essence, a contract for the transportation of produced 
minerals.289  Reference to minerals in the ground simply identified the 
minerals that, once extracted, would flow through the Gatherers’ 
pipelines for a fee.290  A dedication is, therefore, just a pledge that 
 
281. Id. at 596 (citing Nelson v. Farr, 354 P.2d 163, 166 (Colo. 1960)). 
282. Id. at 595 (citing B.B. & C. P’ship v. Edelweiss Condo. Ass’n, 218 P.3d 310, 315 
(Colo. 2009)). 
283. Id. at 596. 
284. Id. at 608. 
285. Id. at 598 (internal parenthetical omitted). 
286. Id. 
287. See id. at 599–600. 
288. Id. 
289. See id. 
290. Id. 
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identifies the minerals that, once extracted, will be subjected to the 
services identified in the Transportation Agreements.291  As a result, a 
dedication identifying pledged minerals does not inherently burden those 
minerals.292   
While the Transportation Agreements contractually obligated 
Extraction to deliver to Gatherers its pledged minerals, once extracted, 
the Transportation Agreements did not grant any right to the Gatherers to 
affect Extraction's in-ground minerals.293  As stressed by the court, 
“Extraction retains exclusive control and possession of all minerals from 
severance from the ground through delivery into the pipeline systems … 
Extraction retains title to the crude petroleum throughout the entire 
transportation process, and the [Gatherers] never obtain title to the crude 
petroleum at any point.”294  Fundamentally, the Transportation 
Agreements did not affect Extraction's use or enjoyment of oil in place or 
the use of the mineral estate.  It only affected what Extraction could do 
with its extracted minerals.295  As a result, the Transportation Agreements 
did not touch and concern the land—in this case, Extraction’s mineral 
estate. 
2.  Extraction: Privity of Estate 
Under Colorado law, “[p]rivity of estate requires that the 
covenants that allegedly run with the land be accompanied by a 
contemporaneous conveyance of some interest in the land with which the 
covenant runs.”296  A later-in-time conveyance cannot establish privity 
for an earlier-in-time covenant.297  The court continued, noting that once 
a surface and mineral estate are severed, they remain separate and distinct 
estates in real property.298  As a result, the conveyance of an interest in a 
 
291. Id. at 600–01. 
292. Id. 
293. Id. at 601–02. 
294. Id. 
295. Id. 
296. Id. at 605 (citing Taylor v. Melton, 274 P.2d 977, 988-89 (Colo. 1954)). 
297. Id. at 606–07 (holding that a conveyance of rights-of-way two years after entry into 
the Transportation Agreements could not satisfy privity of estate even if it affected 
Extraction’s mineral estate, because it was not “contemporaneous with the creation of the 
covenant intended to run.”) (emphasis in original). 
298. Id. at 605 (citing Notch Mountain Corp. v. Elliot, 898 P.2d 550, 556 (Colo. 1995)). 
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severed surface estate will not satisfy the privity test for a covenant 
burdening the severed mineral estate.299  
None of the conveyances asserted by the Gatherers, which 
included “purported easements or rights-of-way on Extraction's surface 
estate” and “the Transportation Agreements' dedications,” satisfied 
Colorado's privity of estate test because none of them involved a 
conveyance of Extraction's mineral estate.300  The court reasoned that the 
dedication granted personal rights for the use of the surface estate, but 
that those rights were inherently severed from the mineral estate.301  Just 
because a gatherer is entitled to access or develop the surface does not 
actually give it any interest in the mineral estate.  Moreover, the 
dedication of surface rights could not by itself be a covenant running with 
the land.  As the court reasoned, the surface estate dedications “cannot be 
both the real covenant and the element that satisfies privity of estate to 
create a real covenant.”302  Without some other contemporaneous 
conveyance, the Gatherers could not satisfy the privity element of the 
“runs with the land” test.303  The Extraction gathering agreement was not, 
therefore, a covenant running with the land. 
3.  Extraction: A Return to Sabine? 
The Extraction decision is important for several reasons.  First, it 
is one of the only widely publicized decisions304 addressing gathering 
agreements that stresses a common law disfavor for the creation of 
covenants running with the land.  Second, it returns to Sabine’s focus on 
the separation of the surface and mineral estate and treats each as largely 
independent real property interests.  Doing so raises the burden of proving 
 
299. Id. 
300. Id. at 607. 
301. Id. at 607–08 (citing Lobato v. Taylor, 71 P.3d 938, 945 (Colo. 2002)). 
302. Id. at 608–09. 
303. Id. at 605.  
304. See, e.g., Allison Good, Extraction Oil & Gas can Reject Midstream Contracts, 
Bankruptcy Court Says, S&P GLOBAL MKT. INTELLIGENCE, (Oct. 15, 2020), 
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-
headlines/extraction-oil-gas-can-reject-midstream-contracts-bankruptcy-court-says-
60747959 [https://perma.cc/4QAS-DRE9]; Greg Avery, Colorado Oil Company Wins 
Pipeline Ruling from Bankruptcy Court, DENVER BUS. J. (Oct. 15, 2020, 8:33 AM) 
https://www.bizjournals.com/denver/news/2020/10/15/extraction-midstream-chapter-11-
bankruptcy-court.html [https://perma.cc/A4QJ-URAG]. 
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the existence of a covenant running with the land.  Third, the court in 
Extraction arguably disagreed with Badlands’ ruling that a covenant 
running with the land is not an “interest” for the purposes of section 363 
of the Bankruptcy Code.  In dicta, the court in Extraction noted that a 
“covenant running with the land, creates ‘an equitable property interest 
in the burdened land’” and cited a quotation stating “covenants running 
with the land, are not a lien or executory contract but rather, ‘an interest 
in land . . . .’”305 
B. In re Chesapeake Energy Corporation: Houston, Do We Have a 
Contradiction? 
On June 28, 2020, energy giant Chesapeake Energy Corporation 
and its affiliates (collectively “Chesapeake”) filed for bankruptcy relief 
and immediately moved to reject a natural gas purchase agreement with 
its pipeline counterparty (“ETC”).306  Chesapeake entered into the 
agreements with ETC more than four years before Chesapeake's 
bankruptcy filing.307  Under the ETC agreements, Chesapeake agreed to 
sell and ETC agreed to purchase all of Chesapeake's gas from dedicated 
leases, subject to certain allowed uses by Chesapeake, up to certain 
agreed volume limits.308  
As part of the agreements, Chesapeake dedicated “for sale and 
delivery hereunder all of the Gas owned or controlled by [Chesapeake] 
that is produced from the oil and gas leases described” in an exhibit to the 
agreement.309  The dedication expressly stated that it was “a covenant 
running with the land, and [ETC] and [Chesapeake] shall sign, and [ETC] 
shall file in the property records of the applicable county or counties, a 
Memorandum of this Transaction Confirmation . . . .”310  Despite the 
purported covenant running with the land in Chesapeake's gas, ETC's 
exclusive remedy for Chesapeake's breach under the agreements was a 
right to money damages.311 
 
305. In re Extraction Oil & Gas, Inc., 622 B.R. 581, 596 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020) (emphasis 
added). 
306. In re Chesapeake Energy Corp., 622 B.R. 274, 276–77 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2020). 
307. Id. at 277. 
308. Id. 
309. Id. at 278. 
310. Id. 
311. Id. at 279. 
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1.  Chesapeake: The Texas Test 
When analyzing whether the Chesapeake agreements were 
covenants running with the land, the court applied a six element test 
slightly different than that referenced in Sabine: (1) did the obligation 
touch and concern the land; (2) did the obligation relate to a thing in 
existence or bind the parties and their assigns; (3) did the parties intend 
for the obligation to run with the land; (4) did the successor to the burden 
have notice of the obligation; (5) was there privity of estate or vertical 
privity between the parties at the time the covenant was created; and (6) 
was there horizontal privity.312  However, the court noted, while listing 
those elements, that in Energytec the Fifth Circuit questioned whether 
horizontal privity remains an element of the “runs with the land test.”313   
While the court appears to be skeptical of the necessity of its 
inclusion, it recognized that, though questioned by the Fifth Circuit, the 
court in Energytec did in fact perform a horizontal privity test as part of 
its analysis.314  Moreover, while the court lists six potential elements for 
inclusion in the Texas test, its analysis focused only on the three standard 
elements addressed by each of the cases analyzed in this article:  (1) did 
the covenant touch and concern the land; (2) was there privity of estate; 
and (3) did the parties intend to create a covenant running with the land.315 
As a preliminary matter, the Chesapeake court noted that 
executory contracts and covenants running with the land are not mutually 
exclusive.316  Judge Jones reasoned that nothing in the text of section 365 
of the Bankruptcy Code creates mutual exclusivity, and that it is possible 
to contemplate an executory contract that also contains a covenant that 
runs with the land.317  The court stated that, in such an event, the 
 
312. Id. at 281 (citing In re El Paso Refiner, LP., 302 D.3d 343, 355 (5th Cir. 2002) (cited 
for first four elements); In re Energytex, Inc., 739 F.3d 215, 221 (5th Cir. 2013) (cited for the 
fifth element and sixth elements)). 
313. Id. at 281. (citing Energytex, 739 F.3d at 221). 
314. Id. 
315. Id. at 282–283. 
316. Id. at 281. 
317. Id. (“ETC repeatedly asserts that the ETC Purchase Agreement cannot be an executory 
contract if it contains a covenant that runs with the land. ETC does not cite nor is the Court 
able to locate any authority for such a proposition. Likewise, § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code 
contains no such exclusion and no known rule or law prohibits the mutual existence of both 
concepts within a single document. It does not stretch the imagination to envision a contract 
that both contains a covenant that runs with the land and is executory. In such a circumstance, 
the appropriate analysis is what benefit was previously bestowed by the debtor on the non-
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“appropriate analysis is what benefit was previously bestowed by the 
debtor on the non-rejecting party that remains post-rejection and what 
future performance by the debtor is excused by the rejection.”318  While 
the court opened the door to a whole new issue—whether a party could 
reject an executory contract that otherwise created a limited covenant 
running with the land—it found no need to pursue the analysis in light of 
the terms of the contract in question.319 
2.  Chesapeake: Touch and Concern 
Under Texas law, a covenant “touches and concerns the land 
when the underlying obligations affect the nature, quality or value of the 
thing demised, independently of collateral circumstances, or it affect[s] 
the mode of enjoying it.”320  In Chesapeake, ETC argued that the 
agreement touched and concerned Chesapeake's mineral estate because 
of Chesapeake's dedication of all of its gas321 produced from specifically 
identified oil and gas leases.  Further, ETC noted that the memorandum 
recording Chesapeake's purported covenant dedicated all gas owned by 
Chesapeake “and underlying or produced from the Dedicated Leases . . 
.” to ETC.322 As a result, ETC argued, the covenant touched minerals 
underlying specific leases.323  The court rejected ETC's argument by 
applying an analysis similar to that applied in Sabine. 
First, the court determined that the dedication applied only to 
produced gas, which necessarily meant gas that had been removed from 
the ground and was ready for collection at the debtor's wellheads.324  
Under Texas law, gas that has been extracted from the ground is personal 
 
rejecting party that remains post-rejection and what future performance by the debtor is 
excused by the rejection. Depending on the particular language of the subject agreement, a 
plethora of outcomes are possible.”) (citation omitted).  
318. Id. (citing Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652, 1658 
(2019) (addressing effects of rejection on licensee’s right to continue use of licensed 
trademark after licensor’s rejection of parties’ executory contract)). 
319. Id. 
320. Id. at 283 (citing In re El Paso Refinery, LP, 302 F.3d 343, 356 (5th Cir. 2002)); 
Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903, 911 (Tex. 1982); Wimberly v. 
Lone Star Gas Co., 818 S.W.2d 868, 871 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1991) (writ denied). 
321. Up to certain volume limits referenced in the agreement known as the “SRC”. 
322. Id. at 278 n.2. 
323. See id.  
324. Id. 
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property.325  Accordingly, although the dedication referenced “Dedicated 
Leases,” the substance actually dedicated to ETC was produced gas in 
certain volumes.326  As the court reasoned, “[o]nly after gas is produced 
and becomes personal property does an obligation regarding the 
disposition of that gas arise.”327 
Second, the court analyzed whether the purported covenant 
running with the land actually affected Chesapeake's real property 
interests.328  The court determined that under the agreement, ETC had “no 
right of access to or control over Chesapeake's use of its real property 
interest.”329  ETC had a right to receive produced gas under the agreement 
and nothing more.  Further, its only remedy was a claim for monetary 
damages against Chesapeake.  Without more, the court reasoned, the 
agreement did not “touch and concern” Chesapeake's real property 
mineral interests.330 
3.  Chesapeake: Privity 
The court's analysis of whether privity existed diverged 
considerably from that of Sabine.  While the Chesapeake court 
summarily found a lack of horizontal privity, it focused its privity 
analysis almost exclusively on vertical privity under Texas law.331  
Vertical privity requires only a “mutual or successive relationship to the 
same rights of property.”332  The question in Chesapeake was therefore 
whether Chesapeake transferred any interest in its real property to ETC. 
ETC asserted that the language of dedication evidenced such a 
transfer.333  ETC argued that under the ETC Agreement's express terms, 
Chesapeake dedicated “such property rights arising out of the Dedicated 
Leases necessary to burden the Dedicated Leases with [Chesapeake’s] 
dedication of the Dedicated Leases and Gas,” and that this specific 
 
325. Id. (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Adams, 513 F.2d 355, 363 (5th Cir. 1975)). 




330. See id. at 282–83. 
331. Id. at 284. 
332. Id. at 283. 
333. Id.  
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reference to “property rights” satisfied vertical privity.334  Admittedly, 
that language is difficult to follow.  The court, however, translated it to 
mean “we dedicate whatever is necessary to make sure that the dedication 
is valid.”335  Chesapeake's agreement with ETC was, in essence, a 
forward contract for the purchase of gas.336  While ETC had a contractual 
right to purchase Chesapeake's produced gas from a dedicated area for a 
certain fee, no dedication or conveyance of any real property interest was 
necessary to effectuate any of the terms and conditions of the 
agreement.337  Without that corollary, there was no vertical privity in 
Chesapeake.338  Having failed to prove any of the necessary elements to 
establish a covenant running with the land, the court ruled against ETC 
and determined that the contract was executory and subject to rejection. 
4.  A Disagreement in Houston? Perhaps not. 
The Chesapeake decision is notable in part because it was 
rendered by Judge Jones, who is bench mates with Judge Isgur at the 
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, 
 
334. Id. (emphasis added). 
335. Id. 
336. Id. at 283–84.  Quoting section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code for the definition of a 
“forward contract,” the court explains as follows:   
 
Under § 101 of the Bankruptcy Code, a forward contract means: [A] 
contract (other than a commodity contract, as defined in section 761) for 
the purchase, sale, or transfer of a commodity, as defined in section 
761(8) of this title, or any similar good, article, service, right, or interest 
which is presently or in the future becomes the subject of dealing in the 
forward contract trade, or product or byproduct thereof, with a maturity 
date more than two days after the date the contract is entered into, 
including, but not limited to, a repurchase or reverse repurchase 
transaction (whether or not such repurchase or reverse repurchase 
transaction is a “repurchase agreement”, as defined in this section) [2] 
consignment, lease, swap, hedge transaction, deposit, loan, option, 
allocated transaction, unallocated transaction, or any other similar 
agreement . . . . The parties' agreement is indicative that the object of the 
ETC Purchase Agreement is the ongoing purchase and sale of personal 
property—not the burdening of a real property interest. 
 
Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(25)(A)).   
337. Id. 
338. Id. at 284. 
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Houston Division.339  Judge Isgur of course decided Alta Mesa.  Further, 
it involved a Texas judge applying Texas law and, like Sabine, finding 
that a midstream oil and gas contract masquerading as a covenant running 
with the land was a rejectable executory contract.  On its face, it initially 
appears that Judge Jones diverges from Judge Isgur's ruling in Alta Mesa.  
A closer reading, however, suggests otherwise.   
In his ruling, Judge Jones considers an argument from ETC in 
which ETC states that Alta Mesa unequivocally stands for the proposition 
that the inclusion of a covenant running with the land in a contract 
precludes rejection.340  While Judge Jones perhaps surprisingly 
challenged ETC's interpretation, he did affirmatively state that the 
decision in Alta Mesa was “proper given the relief requested, the 
arguments raised by the parties and addressed by the court . . . .”341   
What is perhaps more surprising is that Judge Jones affirmatively 
applied Judge Isgur's Alta Mesa analysis when issuing his conclusion and 
ruling.342  Applying Judge Isgur's analysis appears unnecessary under the 
circumstances.  First, Alta Mesa involved Oklahoma law, not Texas law.  
Judge Isgur's decision in Alta Mesa promoted a liberal application of the 
“runs with the land” test under Oklahoma law as opposed to the 
considerably more conservative approach in Sabine, which applied Texas 
law.  That conflict is noticeable in Chesapeake.  Although Judge Jones 
approved Judge Isgur's liberal Alta Mesa analysis, he also recognized that 
Texas Supreme Court case law disfavors covenants running with the land, 
 
339. Judge Jones and Judge Isgur handle the vast majority of complex chapter 11 
bankruptcy cases filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of 
Texas.  Recently, their Houston courtrooms have become among the busiest commercial 
bankruptcy courts in the nation, and among the most influential courts addressing oil and gas 
bankruptcy issues in the United States.  See December 2020 Bankruptcy Statistics – 
Commercial Filings, AM. BANKR. INST., https://www.abi.org/newsroom/bankruptcy-statistics 
[https://perma.cc/37UQ-EBCX] (reporting that the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
Southern District of Texas received the second-most commercial bankruptcy filings in the 
United States in 2020 and received nearly 60% more filings than it did in 2019 despite a 
16.75% reduction in total commercial filings nationally.  For comparison, the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York saw almost no increase in filings in 
2020).  
340. In re Chesapeake Energy Corp., 622 B.R. 274, 281 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2020). 
341. Id. at 281–82. 
342. Id. at 284 (“Applying Judge Isgur's analysis in Alta Mesa and the specific content of 
the ETC Purchase Agreement, the Court concludes that . . . .”).  The authors suspect that Judge 
Jones included this statement, which was unnecessary considering Alta Mesa was determined 
under a different state’s law, to ensure the Chesapeake decision is not later used to evidence 
a shift in the court’s reasoning from Alta Mesa to something closer to Sabine. 
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and that all ambiguities must be strictly construed against the party 
seeking to enforce a covenant running with the land under Texas law.343  
Judge Jones’s does little to resolve that apparent contradiction.   
Second, the distinguishing elements of the Alta Mesa decision are 
absent in Chesapeake.  Alta Mesa, like Sabine, included a dedication of 
produced minerals—a personal property interest—along with certain 
rights related to the surface estate.  Contrary to Sabine, Judge Isgur 
determined that despite dedicating only produced minerals, the 
conveyance of interests in the surface estate resulted in a covenant that 
ran with the underlying mineral estate because of the interconnected 
nature of those estates in the context of a gathering agreement.  
Chesapeake, however, did not even involve dedications of surface rights 
or the development of any gathering system.  Its analysis is, in relevant 
part, rather inapplicable to the facts of Chesapeake.  Regardless, 
Chesapeake denied the existence of a covenant running with the land in 
a contract that involved a dedication of produced gas; thus, it appears Alta 
Mesa remains superior to Sabine in the Southern District of Texas.  It is 
not, however, the favored law of the United States Bankruptcy Court for 
the District of Delaware. 
C. In re Southland Royalty Company: Another Covenant Bites the 
Dust 
Southland Royalty Company LLC (“Southland”) is an upstream 
exploration and production company “focused on the acquisition, 
development, and exploitation of oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquid 
reserves in North America.”344  In 2016, Southland acquired its interests 
in oil and gas wells covering more than 500,000 net working interest 
acres in the Wamsutter Field of Wyoming through a transaction with 
Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC, Anadarko Land Corp., and Kerr-McGee 
Oil and Gas Onshore, LP (collectively, “Anadarko”).345 
In June, 2016, Southland entered into contracts with Wamsutter 
LLC (“Wamsutter”), a large midstream pipeline company, for the 
 
343. See id. at 281 (“Covenants restricting the unfettered use of one's real property are 
generally disfavored under Texas law. Any ambiguity is strictly construed against the party 
seeking to enforce the restriction.”) (citing Wilmoth v. Wilcox, 734 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tex. 
1987)).  
344. In re Southland Royalty Co. LLC, 623 B.R. 64, 71 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020). 
345. Id. 
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treatment, processing, and transportation of minerals extracted from its 
interests in the Wamsutter Field.346  Wamsutter's gathering system is 
described by the court as “a large highway of pipes, compressors, 
dehydrators, processing plants, and other facilities that enable Wamsutter 
to gather, transport, process, and treat the gas produced from Southland's 
wells so that it can be taken downstream for sale.”347  In total, the 
Wamsutter gathering system consists of, “among other things, thousands 
of miles of pipelines, numerous gas compressor stations, and a gas 
processing plant.”348  Given the size and scope of the gathering system 
and the Wamsutter Field, Wamsutter's facilities are critical to upstream 
entities like Southland that want to take their produced minerals to 
market. 
At issue in Southland were two gathering agreements.349  The first 
gathering agreement between Southland and Wamsutter, dated June 1, 
2016 is known as the L60 Agreement.350  The L60 Agreement expires by 
its terms on December 31, 2031.351  The second, dated November 1, 2018, 
is known as the L63 Agreement (and together, the “Gas Gathering 
Agreements”).352  The L63 Agreement expires by its terms on October 1, 
2038.353 
Most of Southland's wells under the L60 Agreement were 
traditional vertical wells.354  Shortly after acquiring its interest from 
Anadarko, Southland desired to effectuate a large horizontal drilling 
program in an effort to dramatically increase production in the Wamsutter 
Field.355  To handle the increased production, Southland contracted with 





349. See supra notes 158–63 and accompanying text. 
350. In re Southland Royalty Co. LLC, 623 B.R. at 71–72. 
351. Id. 
352. Id. 
353. Id. at 73. 
354. Id. at 72–73 (“Because the then-existing Wamsutter Gathering System was designed 
to accommodate vertical wells, it was determined that modifications were needed to provide 
incremental capacity to accommodate Southland's future horizontal wells. Horizontal wells 
typically produce gas at a much higher volume than vertical wells. As a result, if not updated, 
a gathering system servicing vertical wells may be incapable of handling the additional 
volume from horizontal wells. The resulting increased pressure on the system could reduce or 
completely stop production from the vertical wells.”) (emphasis added).   
355. Id. 
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stations, miles of additional pipeline, and other related equipment.356  
Wamsutter expected the project to cost approximately $350 million to 
complete.357  In order to effectuate the expansion, the parties executed the 
L63 Agreement.358  
The “Shippers Dedication” found in the L63 Agreement states, in 
pertinent part: 
 
Shipper dedicates to the performance of this Agreement 
the Dedicated Properties and Dedicated Gas and grants to 
[Wamsutter] the exclusive right to Gather, Process, 
Dehydrate and Treat the Produced Dedicated Gas 
(“Dedication”).  This Dedication shall be a covenant 
running with the land under applicable law and binding 
on the respective successors and assigns of the interests 
of Shipper and its Affiliates in and to the Dedicated 
Properties and Dedicated Gas.  If applicable law requires 
any amendment or modification to this Agreement for 
this Dedication to be treated as an enforceable covenant 
running with the land, the parties will promptly enter into 
any such addendum or modification.  Gatherer may file 
memoranda of this Agreement substantially in the form 
of Exhibit “J” in local land records from time to time in 
its discretion, and Shipper will promptly enter into any 
such memoranda upon request.359 
By contrast, the L60 Agreement's “Shippers Dedication” states, “Shipper 
dedicates Shipper's Gas within the Area of Interest described in Exhibit 
B to [Wamsutter] for Gathering, Processing, Dehydrating and Treating.” 
Following the execution of the L63 Agreement, the parties 
worked together on the development of the corresponding gathering 
infrastructure.  In late 2019, however, Southland began to experience 
severe economic hardship and demanded that Wamsutter cease all 





359. Id. at 74–75.   
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improvements.360  In its notice to Wamsutter, Southland admitted to 
suffering from diminished drilling economics and limited access to 
capital caused by the decline in commodity prices, underperforming 
wells, and unanticipated operational issues.361 
On January 27, 2020, Southland filed for bankruptcy relief under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.362  Instead of immediately 
challenging whether the Gas Gathering Agreements were covenants 
running with the land, Southland pursued a robust, well marketed sale 
process for substantially all of its assets in the Wamsutter Field.363  As 
part of the sale process, Southland worked to facilitate a renegotiation of 
the L63 agreement between potential purchasers and Wamsutter, who 
willingly participated in those discussions.364   
Unfortunately, no potential purchaser was able to reach any 
meaningful agreement with Wamsutter over the renegotiation of the L63 
Agreement and its minimum volume commitments.365  As a result, 
Southland's sale process failed and, on March 27, 2020, Southland 
commenced an adversary proceeding against Wamsutter seeking a 
declaratory judgment holding, in pertinent part, that the Gas Gathering 
Agreements were subject to rejection as executory contracts.366  After a 
lengthy trial, supplemental briefing, and extensive oral argument, the 
court ruled that “for many of the same reasons set forth by the courts in 
Sabine and Extraction, the L63 Agreement contains no real 
covenants.”367  Instead, the court ruled, it was merely a services contract 
for the gathering of Southland’s personal property.368  More surprisingly, 
the court further ruled that even if the L63 Agreement did contain a “real 
covenant,” it could be rejected under section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy 
Code.369 
 
360. See id. at 75. 
361. Id.  
362. Id. at 71. 




367. Id. at 79–80.  
368. Id. at 80.  
369. Id. 
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Beginning its analysis, the court in Southland noted that 
covenants running with the land are typically disfavored.370  As a general 
rule, under Wyoming law, no one should be held liable for obligations 
under a contract unless by his express consent by entry into the 
agreement.371  As a result, covenants running with the land that 
automatically burden successive owners should be considered an 
exception to the general rule and should be disfavored.372 
To create a covenant running with the land under Wyoming law, 
four elements are required: (1) the original covenant must be enforceable; 
(2) the parties must intend the covenant runs with the land; (3) the 
covenant must touch and concern the land; and (4) there must be privity 
of estate between the parties.373  Importantly, because covenants running 
with the land are disfavored under Wyoming law, they must “be strictly 
constructed, will not extend by implication, and in case of doubt the 
restriction will be constructed in favor of the free use of the land.”374  This 
article focuses on whether the purported covenant touched and concerned 
the land and whether there was privity estate between the parties, as those 
two elements are consistently determinative in each of the previous 
bankruptcy decisions addressing whether a covenant runs with the land. 
1.  Southland: Touch and Concern 
In Southland, the court determined that, under Wyoming law, the 
question of whether a covenant touched and concerned the land depended 
on whether it substantively affected Southland's “legal rights in its real 
property.”375  The court ruled with beautiful simplicity that “the L63 
Dedication does not alter Southland's legal rights in its real property.”376  
In support of its ruling, the court reasoned that: 
 
 
370. Id. at 80–82. 
371. Id.  
372. Id. 
373. Id. at 80. 
374. Id. at 82 n.65 (citing Kincheloe v. Milatzo, 678 P.2d 855, 859 (Wyo. 1984); Kindler 
v. Anderson, 433 P.2d 268 (1967); Pennaco Energy Inc. v. KD Co., LLC, 363 P.3d 18, 37 
(Wyo. 2015)). 
375. Id. at 83. 
376. Id. 
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It is undisputed that Southland is free to do what it likes 
with its unproduced gas reserves, including decreasing or 
ceasing further exploration, drilling, and 
production…Wamsutter has no right to enter the L63 Are 
of Interest and access or control Southland's unproduced 
reserves, including through its own development.  It is 
only once the gas in the L63 Area of Interest is produced 
that the L63 Dedication takes affect by requiring the 
production to be served by Wamsutter and the Wamsutter 
Gathering System in exchange for the agreed upon fees.  
At that point, Wamsutter takes title to and control of the 
produced gas . . . .”377 
Accordingly, only Southland's produced gas from the L63 Area of 
Interest was affected by the Dedication, and produced gas is a personal 
property interest under Wyoming law.378   
Further, the court continued, any benefit to the value of 
Southland's reserves caused by the Wamsutter gathering system was 
indirect, or collateral, because they arose only from services associated 
with Southland's produced gas.379  As the Dedication only directly affects 
Southland's legal rights in its produced gas—personal property—it 
cannot run with the land. 
2.  Southland: Privity of Estate 
Under Wyoming law, privity of estate can only be created by a 
conveyance of the real property that the parties seek to encumber.380  The 
court noted that the L63 Dedication was not a conveyance of a real 
property interest but instead an exclusivity agreement tied to produced 
gas—personal property.381  Because the debtor did not convey its mineral 
estate, the mineral estate could not be burdened by a covenant running 
 
377. Id. at 83–84.  
378. Id. at 84. 
379. Id. at 85.   
380. Id. at 86 (“Privity of estate can only be created in the first instance in connection with 
a grant of the land sought to be charged, or an estate therein, or the equivalent thereof.”) (citing 
Lingle Water Users’ Ass’n v. Occidental Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 297 P. 385, 391 (1931)). 
381. Id. 
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with the land.382  Applying a Sabine-like analysis, the court further ruled 
that any floating easements conveyed in the L63 Agreement or executed 
between the parties were not tied to Southland's mineral interests because 
the surface and mineral estates are severed.383  Accordingly, even a 
conveyance of a real property interest in Southland’s surface estate could 
not give rise to a covenant burdening Southland’s mineral estate.  As a 
result, the court found no privity of estate, and that the L63 Agreement 
was not a covenant running with the land. 
3.  Southland: Rejecting Badlands—Court Precludes Equivalent of 
Priming Lien in Favor of Midstream Gatherer 
Although the court in Southland ruled that the L63 Agreement 
could be rejected as an executory contract, it also held in dicta that 
Southland could sell its assets free and clear of the L63 Agreement even 
if it was a covenant running with the land.384  In doing so, it rejected 
Badlands.  First, the court noted that section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy 
Code should be broadly applied.385  A covenant running with the land 
does not constitute something other than an “interest” as that term is used 
in section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code.386  The question should not be 
whether a covenant runs with the land is an “interest,” but whether there 
are grounds under section 363(f)(1)–(5) of the Bankruptcy Code to sell 
the asset free and clear of the covenant.387 
According to Southland, Wyoming foreclosure law allowing a 
senior lienholder to foreclose out a junior encumbrance, including a 
covenant running with the land, satisfies section 363(f)(1) of the 
Bankruptcy code.  Accordingly, Southland could sell its assets free and 
clear of any covenant running with the land arising from the L63 
Agreement.388   
Wyoming law also allows the satisfaction of a covenant running 
with the land by money judgment.  As the court recited, “[u]nder 
Wyoming law, it is well established that both legal and equitable 
remedies are available in covenant enforcement actions.  Valid 
 
382 .See id. 
383. Id. at 86–87. 
384. Id. at 96–97. 
385. Id. at 97 (citing In re Trans World Airlines, Inc. 322 F.3d 283, 289 (3d Cir. 2003)). 
386. See id. 
387. Id. (citing In re Energytec, 739 F.3d 215, 225-26 (5th Cir. 2013)). 
388. Id. at 97–98. 
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covenants, like other contracts and property interests, can be enforced and 
protected by both legal and equitable remedies as appropriate . . . .”389  As 
a result, Southland could also sell its assets “free and clear” under section 
363(f)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code.390 
VI.  THE SOUTHLAND CONUNDRUM: BIG PICTURE APPLICATION OF 
RECENT RULINGS AND REMAINING UNCERTAINTY 
A. Rejecting Gathering Agreements: Far from a Panacea  
On December 5, 2019, Wamsutter's Chief Executive Officer, 
Alan Armstrong, summarily dismissed questions raised at an investor 
conference about the potential rejection of Wamsutter's gathering 
agreements in bankruptcy.391  Armstrong noted his frustration with the 
question, pointed out that none of Wamsutter's gathering agreements with 
other producers had ever been rejected, and stated that rejection made no 
sense because “there is no other feasible way to move the commodity to 
the market and get paid than to own the gathering system, and so if you 
think about the opportunity to reject a contract you would have to believe 
the avoided cost of building a system . . . is better than current pricing.”392   
Armstrong's analysis reflects a harsh reality.  Even if an upstream 
debtor can reject its gathering agreement, is there any economically 
feasible alternative that will enable the upstream debtor to get its 
produced minerals to market?  That is a very real and very difficult 
question for some bankrupt upstream debtors whose leases are located in 
isolated areas, areas with minimal pipeline development, or in areas in 
which one midstream gatherer provides substantially all gathering 
services to upstream producers.  
Southland presents a prime example of this.  While Southland 
successfully rejected the L63 Agreement, the question quickly became 
“what next?”  If Southland will not use Wamsutter, but Wamsutter is the 
 
389. Id. at 98 (citing Essex Holding, LLC v. Basic Props., Inc., 427 P.3d 708, 724 (Wyo. 
2018)). 
390. Id. at 98–99. 
391. Allison Good, Gas Gathering Contracts Safe from Customer Credit Woes, Williams 
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only gathering system around, Southland will have to develop its own 
pipeline at great cost.  As noted above, Wamsutter invested hundreds of 
millions of dollars developing pipeline based on Southland’s bullish 
expectations.  Southland lacks capital to develop its own pipeline, and its 
reserves are already fully encumbered.  Southland must, therefore, 
consider alternatives.  Can Southland incentivize a Wamsutter competitor 
to develop new gathering systems to service its wells?  Unfortunately, the 
answer is “not likely.”  Further, the cost of development may exceed the 
value of Southland's reserves, sounding a death knell to Southland’s 
continuing operations.   
The Southland conundrum does not end there.  If Southland 
cannot negotiate any economically favorable gathering agreement, it may 
have no real chance of selling its assets for value.  Imagine the following 
hypothetical:  Southland possesses mineral reserves valued at 
$500,000,000 and successfully rejected Wamsutter’s Gas Gathering 
Agreements in bankruptcy.393  Due to liquidity issues, Southland cannot 
afford a new gathering and processing system and has no alternative 
midstream counterparty with which to enter into a new gathering 
agreement.  Due to depressed mineral prices, Southland’s lenders are 
under-secured and cannot loan Southland more money to develop a 
gathering system.394  As a result, Southland cannot produce and sell its 
minerals.  It has no means of monetizing its reserves.   
Faced with such a bad situation, Southland may seek to liquidate 
its assets, but who would buy Southland’s assets?  A buyer would have 
to negotiate a new gathering agreement with Wamsutter or spend a huge 
sum of money developing its own gathering and processing system, 
which is implausible.395  Wamsutter may refuse negotiations because of 
its own interest in acquiring Southland’s assets.  Moreover, without a 
gathering agreement, there is simply too much risk for any potential 
purchaser to buy Southland’s assets.  Accordingly, Southland can neither 
monetize its reserves through operations nor monetize its assets through 
a sale to a third-party purchaser.  Southland’s senior reserve-based lender 
may therefore decline to foreclose on its collateral for substantially the 
 
393. See In re Southland Royalty Co. LLC, 623 B.R. at 96–97. 
394. See supra Part I (describing the collapse in energy prices during 2020). 
395. See supra Section II.A.1. (describing the importance of gathering agreements to oil 
and gas production). 
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same reasons.  Southland’s lender would simply step into Southland’s 
shoes with no means of disposing of its collateral in a lucrative manner.  
That leaves Wamsutter as the only remaining party that may have 
an interest in Southland’s assets.  Wamsutter already owns a gathering 
and processing system capable of servicing Southland’s wells and is 
familiar with the assets.396  Regardless, Wamsutter has no real 
competition to purchase Southland’s assets, and so Southland’s 
bargaining power in sale negotiations is limited.  Specifically, Wamsutter 
and Southland know, in this hypothetical, that Southland’s assets will 
enable Wamsutter to mitigate its losses and possibly even make a profit, 
but Wamsutter has no remaining competitors.  As a result, Wamsutter 
will likely offer, and Southland will likely accept, a heavily discounted 
purchase price.  Wamsutter becomes the only winner in Southland’s 
bankruptcy case in this hypothetical:  Wamsutter purchases Southland’s 
assets for a pittance, and then extracts, gathers, and processes the minerals 
at great profit.   
In the Southland bankruptcy case, Wamsutter quickly realized the 
power of its position, regardless of whether its Gas Gathering 
Agreements were rejected.  Months into the bankruptcy case, Wamsutter 
filed a Motion for Adequate Protection, or Alternatively, for Relief from 
the Automatic Stay.397  In that motion, Wamsutter pointed out that it was 
the sole means of monetizing Southland’s assets, that Southland had no 
other means of getting its product to market, and that constructing an 
alternative system would be complex and could not be completed on any 
expedited timetable.398  Wamsutter argued that because it was not getting 
paid what it was owed by Southland, but was still processing Southland’s 
minerals, it should be able to simply take Southland’s gas and process 
and sell it for Wamsutter’s own benefit.399 After its Gas Gathering 
Agreements were rejected, Wamsutter only slightly shifted its position 
and engaged in negotiations to acquire all of Southland’s assets at a 
tremendous discount. 
 
396. See supra Section V.C.  
397. Wamsutter LLC’s Motion for Adequate Protection, or Alternatively, for Relief from 
the Automatic Stay, In re Southland Royalty Co. LLC, No. 20-10158, (2020) (D.I. 843). 
398. Id. at ¶ 8. 
399. Id. at ¶ 14. 
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B. The Southland Conundrum: Underwriting Considerations 
From an underwriting perspective, banking clients with whom the 
authors have spoken pointedly raise similar concerns.  Is a successful 
rejection of a gathering agreement really a success?  Is rejection the 
backstop that lenders should rely on to ensure they retain a first-priority 
lien on their collateral?  Are there alternative means for midstream 
gatherers to finance the construction of gathering systems to eliminate or 
at least mitigate confusion and risk?  If a lender's reserve-based loan is 
secured by reserves that cannot be brought to market, what is the real 
value of its collateral?  Does it have any value to any party other than the 
midstream entity that already has a developed pipeline?  All are difficult 
questions, and the Southland case evidences just how troubling these 
issues can be. 
Southland’s conundrum should not be understated.  Regardless of 
reserve reports or other reserve valuations, the minerals securing 
Southland’s lenders’ debts are essentially worth what Wamsutter is 
willing to pay for them.  Accordingly, while Extraction and Southland 
appear to be favorable cases to lenders to upstream debtors, they may 
provide only cold comfort.  There is little practical difference between 
the outcomes in Southland and in Alta Mesa and Badlands.  In each case 
the midstream gatherer’s interests dominated the debtor’s effort to 
reorganize and deprived the debtor’s lender of value.   
One potential solution addresses the nature and construction of 
gathering agreements.  As illustrated above, midstream gatherers often 
rely on dedications and specific language in gathering agreements to 
establish a covenant running with the land that encumbers the upstream 
counterparty’s mineral interests.400  In doing so, the gatherer seeks to 
ensure that it recoups its costs of construction and perhaps makes a profit.  
The creation of a later-in-time real property encumbrance is, however, 
detrimental to the upstream counterparty’s lender and may cause an 
immediate breach of the upstream borrower’s credit agreement.401  Given 
the conflicts between the parties’ interests, one must question whether 
there is a better way.  Based on the authors’ experiences in other 
 
400. See supra Section II.A.2. 
401. See, e.g., In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 550 B.R. 59, 67–68 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016).  
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industries,402 we offer that midstream gatherers could accomplish their 
goals through debt financing and inter-creditor agreements with their 
upstream counterparty’s lender.   
First, doing so would promote transparency.  Earlier-in-time 
lenders would not be surprised by later-in-time encumbrances associated 
with the development of gathering systems that benefitted their 
borrower’s operations.  That transparency would help prevent surprise 
credit agreement defaults like that referenced in Sabine.403  Moreover, 
recording and providing notice of a gatherer’s lien, along with an 
intercreditor and subordination agreement, would provide certainty to all 
parties about who has what rights in the borrower’s collateral. 
Second, a debt instrument with a recorded lien on the upstream 
borrower’s minerals would achieve the gatherer’s goal of recouping the 
costs incurred constructing the gathering system.  Through an 
intercreditor and subordination agreement, the borrower, lender, and 
gatherer could come to terms on the cost and scope of the development 
project and agree which party—the lender or the gatherer—should have 
priority of payments from extracted minerals.  The lender and gatherer 
could even negotiate how proceeds of the sale of the borrower’s assets 
would be remitted to each party in the event of a sale, providing certainty 
should the borrower later file for bankruptcy and sell its assets under 
section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.  That certainty of some recovery 
from the proceeds of a sale should be superior to the chance of possessing 
nothing but a general unsecured claim if, in the alternative, the gatherer’s 
agreement was rejected.  Moreover, possessing a valid secured claim may 
entitle a gatherer to credit bid its debt under section 363(k) of the 
Bankruptcy Code should it wish to acquire the upstream borrower’s 
assets in a bankruptcy sale.404    
    Finally, structuring the borrower’s repayment obligations as a 
secured debt instrument eliminates the need for speculative volume-
 
402. The authors have witnessed the successful use of junior debt financing and 
intercreditor and subordination agreements to allow borrowers’ to successfully expand 
operations in various industries, including heavy machinery manufacturing, horticulture, 
automotive services, real estate development, marketing and advertising, science and 
technology, oilfield services, shipping and trucking, meat packing, ranching, retail, and many 
more. 
403. See, e.g., Sabine, 550 B.R. at  67–68. 
404. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (2018) (allowing a secured creditor to credit big value of its 
interest in debtor’s collateral in section 363 sale). 
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based repayment obligations like those found in Southland, which gave 
rise to damages claims by Wamsutter greatly exceeding any amount spent 
to develop the gathering system.  As shown above, the Wamsutter Gas 
Gathering Agreements had approximately thirty-year terms.  The authors 
are unaware of any reason why Wamsutter could not have obtained a 
secured promissory note from Southland with a similar term and fixed or 
even floating repayment schedule.  With such a note in place, a gatherer 
could simply agree to gather and process the borrower’s extracted 
minerals for a market fee which, when paid in conjunction with debt 
service payments, would ensure that the gatherer is repaid and earns a 
healthy profit.  That could potentially reduce volatility for the benefit of 
all parties involved.  
VII.  CONCLUSION 
An upstream debtor’s ability to reject a gathering agreement in 
bankruptcy is, at times, critical to its efforts to reorganize.  If a debtor 
proves that its gathering agreement is an executory contract and rejects it 
under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor is absolved of any 
future obligations under the agreement.  Moreover, the midstream 
counterparty to the agreement will receive only a general unsecured claim 
in the debtor’s bankruptcy case, which is likely to receive only partial 
payment.405  After rejecting the agreement, the debtor can renegotiate a 
new agreement, contract with a different midstream company, or develop 
its own gathering system as part of its restructuring.  A debtor’s ability to 
reject a gathering agreement can therefore provide great flexibility in a 
bankruptcy restructuring.406 
However, a debtor may not be able to reject a gathering 
agreement if it is deemed a covenant running with the land.407  A covenant 
running with the land is a real property interest and, in most courts, not 
subject to rejection under the Bankruptcy Code.408  To qualify as a 
covenant running with the land, the gathering agreement in question must 
typically satisfy at least three elements under most states’ laws: (1) the 
 
405. See id. §§ 506–507 (referred to as “general” unsecured claims to differentiate them 
from “priority” unsecured claims because they receive no special treatment under the 
Bankruptcy Code.) 
406. See supra Section II.B.2. 
407. See supra Section II.B.2. 
408. See supra Section III.B. 
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parties must intend to create a covenant running with the land; (2) the 
covenant must touch and concern the land it seeks to encumber; and (3) 
there must be privity between the contracting parties.409  Specifically, the 
intent is typically determined by the terms of the agreement and behavior 
of the parties; and a covenant may touch and concern the land where it 
affects the legal rights of the interest owner, or directly affects the value 
or use of the interest the parties seek to encumber.  Finally, there may be 
privity when the owner of the asset the parties seek to encumber actually 
conveys some right, title, or interest in that asset contemporaneously with 
the covenant.   
The issue of whether gathering agreements are executory 
contracts subject to rejection or covenants running with the land is an 
important issue in oil and gas reorganizations and has been litigated to 
judgment no less than five times in as many years.  The earliest case 
addressing the issue, Sabine, applied a narrow test under Texas law and 
ruled that a gathering agreement that dedicates only produced minerals 
does not create a covenant running with the land because, under Texas 
law, produced minerals are personal property.410  Two cases that 
followed, Alta Mesa and Badlands, rejected Sabine and ruled that 
gathering agreements created covenants running with the land where the 
gathering agreements dedicated real property interests related to the 
debtor’s mineral estate, even if not the mineral estate itself.  Moreover, 
the court’s ruling in Badlands indicated that covenants running with the 
land cannot be removed by a bankruptcy sale under section 363 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  The Badlands decisions is particularly concerning for 
reserve-based lenders because it enables a later-in-time encumbrance to 
survive the foreclosure of an earlier-in-time lien.  The continuing later-
in-time encumbrance may preclude the foreclosing lender from 
recovering any value from its encumbered collateral.  
Recently, at least two courts have ruled against Alta Mesa and 
Badlands by holding that gathering agreements do not create covenants 
running with the land unless they materially affect the owner’s rights in 
its minerals.  In so ruling, the courts in Extraction and Southland both 
recognized that regardless of the language of dedications in gathering 
agreements, the agreements are fundamentally service agreements related 
to the gathering and processing of produced gas, which is personal 
 
409. See supra Section III.B. 
410. See supra Section III.B. 
202 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 25 
property, and a covenant running with the land cannot apply to personal 
property interests.   
While Extraction and Southland both follow Sabine, the court in 
Chesapeake affirmed, in dicta, the court’s ruling in Alta Mesa.  As a 
result, at least one court recognizes Alta Mesa as good law.  Even so, the 
court in Chesapeake recognized that covenants running with the land are 
generally disfavored under Texas law, which supports a more 
conservative application of the covenant test than that found in Alta Mesa. 
Regardless, the successful rejection of an upstream debtor’s 
gathering agreement may not ensure the debtor’s ability to reorganize.  
As illustrated in Southland, the rejection of a gathering agreement may 
create additional problems and preclude a market sale of the debtor’s 
assets.  Accordingly, debtors should analyze whether rejection is 
necessary and how it may affect their cases before proceeding.  Similarly, 
lenders should proactively investigate and work to address risks to their 
collateral associated with gathering agreements both in initial 
underwriting, documentation, and during the life of their loan.  
 
